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INTERROGATION AND THE ROBERTS COURT
Jonathan Witmer-Rich*
Abstract
Through 2010, the Roberts Court decided five cases involving the
rules for police interrogation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments:
Kansas v. Ventris; Montejo v. Louisiana; Florida v. Powell; Maryland
v. Shatzer; and Berghuis v. Thompkins. This Article argues that these
decisions show the Roberts Court reshaping constitutional interrogation
rules according to a new (as-yet unarticulated) principle: “fair play” in
interrogations. The Warren Court believed that suspects in police
interrogation were vulnerable to inherent compelling pressures; the
Court correspondingly created procedural interrogation rules under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Miranda and Massiah) to protect
suspects. The Roberts Court does not share that motivating concern. But
rather than overruling Miranda and Massiah, the Court is reanimating
those doctrines according to the new principle of “fair play” in
interrogations. This “fair play” rubric presupposes interrogation
suspects who are autonomous agents, expected to know and protect
their rights.
Part I describes how the Roberts Court’s Fifth Amendment decisions
are best explained by the new rubric of “fair play” in interrogations. Part
II does the same for the Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions. Part III
evaluates this new “fair play” rubric, concluding that it is not a fair and
adequate principle for organizing constitutional interrogation doctrine.
While the Warren Court’s specific rules and remedies for interrogation
law have been criticized over the years from both the left and the right,
its underlying premise—that suspects facing police interrogation are
vulnerable to abuse and overreaching—has proven robust and continues
to find support in decades of empirical work. The Roberts Court’s
presumption that suspects in interrogation are autonomous agents
capable of protecting their own interests is wrong. The resulting rules of
“fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately protect the constitutional
right against self-incrimination and the guarantee of the assistance of
counsel in all criminal cases.
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* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; B.A., Goshen College. Thanks to Joel
Finer, Harvey Gee, Melissa Hamilton, Cynthia Lee, Nancy Leong, John Plecnik, Milena Sterio,
George C. Thomas III, Charles D. Weisselberg, and the participants in the Ohio Legal
Scholarship Workshop for their very helpful feedback on drafts of this Article. Thanks to Maria
Witmer-Rich for her unending support and encouragement.
1189

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 4

1190

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

I. CHANGING RULES FOR FIFTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION:
PROVIDING “FAIR NOTICE,” NOT DISPELLING COERCION .......... 1194
A. Florida v. Powell and Berghuis v. Thompkins:
Transforming Miranda into a “Fair Notice” Right............. 1195
1. Florida v. Powell ........................................................... 1195
2. Berghuis v. Thompkins .................................................. 1199
3. Miranda Is Now About “Fair Notice,” Not
Dispelling Coercion ....................................................... 1203
B. Maryland v. Shatzer: Miranda’s Expiration Date
and a New Prophylactic Antibadgering Rule ...................... 1209
II. RESHAPING RULES FOR SIXTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION:
“FAIR PLAY” FOR BOTH DEFENDANTS AND PROSECUTORS ........ 1212
A. Kansas v. Ventris: “Fair Play,” Impeaching a
Defendant’s Testimony, and Statements Obtained
in Violation of the Sixth Amendment ..................................... 1212
1. Massiah Is Not a Prophylactic Rule, and Massiah
Violations Occur at the Time of Uncounseled
Interrogation .................................................................... 1216
2. “Fair Play” in Interrogation and Prosecution .................. 1218
B. Montejo v. Louisiana: After Erasing Michigan v.
Jackson, a Blank Slate Remains ............................................ 1226
1. Of “Fair Play” and Badgers: Preventing Police
from Asking Suspects to Give Up Previously
Invoked Rights ................................................................ 1230
2. New Rules for “Fair Play” in Sixth Amendment
Interrogation Law: Thompkins Will Apply,
but Shatzer Will Not ....................................................... 1232
a. Sixth Amendment Waivers: Thompkins
Will Apply ................................................................ 1232
b. Sixth Amendment Invocations: Shatzer
Should Not Apply ..................................................... 1234
III. THE “FAIR PLAY” MODEL: FAULTY PREMISES MAKE FOR
BAD DOCTRINE ........................................................................... 1237
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1243
INTRODUCTION
In the first five years since Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
assumed his duties on September 29, 2005, the Supreme Court issued
five decisions involving constitutional limitations on police
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interrogation: Kansas v. Ventris;1 Montejo v. Louisiana;2 Florida v.
Powell;3 Maryland v. Shatzer;4 and Berghuis v. Thompkins.5 All five
decisions limit the protections for interrogation suspects and broaden
police interrogation powers, under either the Fifth Amendment or the
Sixth Amendment.6 While the ongoing erosion of the Warren Court’s
interrogation protections is nothing new,7 these five decisions show the
Roberts Court reshaping interrogation law based on a new underlying
principle: “fair play.”
The purpose animating the Warren Court’s interrogation rules was to
1. 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009).
2. 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
3. 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
4. 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
5. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
6. The Roberts Court also decided one statutory interrogation decision, Corley v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009). In Corley, the only defense win of the Roberts Court
interrogation cases, the Court decided that Congress intended to limit, but not eliminate, the
McNabb-Mallory rule: that “an arrested person’s confession is inadmissible if given after an
unreasonable
delay
in
bringing
him
before
a
judge.”
Id.
at
1562
(citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957)). As a statutory interpretation case, Corley is subject to modification by Congress.
Moreover, the majority opinion is squarely aimed at achieving Congress’s intent in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (2006), and it does not reveal much about the Justices’ underlying theories of
constitutional interrogation rules.
Notably, all five Roberts Court constitutional interrogation decisions were issued in the
2009 or 2010 terms, after Justice Alito assumed his duties on January 31, 2006. Thus, all five
decisions were issued under the watch of the present “conservative” wing of the Roberts
Court—Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito—along with swing vote Justice Kennedy.
Justice Sotomayor assumed office on August 8, 2009, replacing Justice Souter. Justice Souter
participated in all of the 2009 decisions: Corley (majority opinion written by Justice Souter),
Ventris, and Montejo. Justice Sotomayor participated in all of the 2010 decisions: Powell,
Shatzer, and Thompkins. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer participated in all six decisions.
Justice Stevens was the only justice who did not join the majority in any of the five
constitutional interrogation decisions. Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens in the fall of 2010,
after the Roberts Court’s 2009–2010 interrogation decisions were handed down.
On June 16, 2011, the Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09-11121 (2011),
holding that when police interrogate a minor child, that child’s age properly influences the
question of whether that child is in “custody” for Miranda purposes. Because J.D.B. was
decided while this article was being prepared for printing, this Article does not include J.D.B. in
its analysis.
7. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REV.
177, 180 (1984) (arguing “that the Court is determined to limit or overrule Miranda by
erosion”); Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U.
L. REV. 727, 727–28 (1999) (arguing that the Court has “pretend[ed] to abide by Miranda while
eviscerating its substance”); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1841 (1987) (“Although the Court as
yet has given no indication that it is willing to take the more controversial step of overruling
Miranda, it has deeply eroded the foundation of the doctrine, leaving Miranda almost useless in
its present application.”).
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protect vulnerable suspects from overbearing police pressures during
interrogation.8 The Roberts Court decisions pay lip service to that
concern but cannot really be explained by it. For some time now,
commentators have observed that the Supreme Court instead seems to
be shaping interrogation law to facilitate the admission of custodial
confessions, by creating “safe harbor” rules that are relatively clear and
simple for police to satisfy.9 Miranda v. Arizona’s10 original motivating
purpose—protecting vulnerable suspects—appears to have entirely
vanished, prompting a number of academic-style funerals for
Miranda.11 The five Roberts Court interrogation decisions seem to
continue this trend.
But while the Roberts Court continues the trend of draining Miranda
and its sister decision, Massiah v. United States,12 of their original
motivating impetus, it has not overtly abolished or overruled these
doctrines. On the contrary, the Court continues to reaffirm the ongoing
vitality of Miranda and Massiah.13 If the original spirit of constitutional
interrogation law has been drained away, what new spirit now animates
the doctrinal corpus? Each of the five Roberts Court interrogation
decisions involves a different area of interrogation law, and none on its
8. The landmark Warren Court interrogation decisions—most notably Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny, but also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964) and its progeny—created a regime of Fifth and Sixth Amendment interrogation rules
founded on the view that criminal suspects undergoing police interrogation faced serious
pressures that threatened to “exact[] a heavy toll on individual liberty and trade[] on the
weakness of individuals[,]” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455, which is “destructive of human dignity.”
Id. at 457. The Court’s decisions were accordingly motivated by a desire to “dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” Id. at 458.
9. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 45 (1991) (“[M]ost professional law-enforcement organizations had
learned to live with Miranda, and even to love it, to the extent that it provided them with a safe
harbor . . . .”); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030,
1033 (2001) (“[A] ‘constitutional safe harbor rule’ is a judicially created procedure that, if
properly followed by the government actor, insulates the government from the argument that the
constitutional clause at issue was violated.”).
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2010) (“Miranda has effectively been overruled.”);
Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to “Save”
Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 647 (2006) (“Seibert and Patane represent the coup de grace
for the demise of Miranda.”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1519, 1521 (2008) (“Miranda is largely dead.”).
12. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
13. Most notably, the Court declined the chance to overrule Miranda in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). The five decisions discussed herein do not suggest
Miranda will be overruled; on the contrary, some discuss the many Miranda protections that
remain in force. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009).
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face claims to be interconnected by any unifying theme. But all five can
be explained by a single, unacknowledged principle: “fair play” in
interrogation.
The Roberts Court’s principle of “fair play” treats suspects as
autonomous, empowered individuals who possess the knowledge and
wherewithal to assert and protect their rights and interests. A suspect
who police interrogate must receive “fair notice” of his rights, but not
much more (Powell and Thompkins). A charged, represented defendant
must not be unfairly deprived of the equalizing protections of counsel in
interrogations, but the defendant also will not be permitted to unfairly
game the system by taking the stand at trial and testifying in conflict
with an earlier statement (Ventris). A willing suspect will not be
protected from (often unwisely) talking to the police, but a suspect will
be entitled to protection from excessive “badgering” by police once she
has made clear her desire to assert her rights (Shatzer and possibly
Montejo).
The spirit that animated the Warren Court’s decisions in Miranda
and Massiah—protecting vulnerable suspects from police coercion—
has died. But the name and mantle of Miranda and Massiah live on,
with a still central place in constitutional interrogation law. The Roberts
Court is reanimating Miranda and Massiah with a new and wholly
different spirit: creating rules for “fair play” in interrogation that
facilitate the admissibility of custodial confessions at trial. The death of
a sovereign monarch prompts the proclamation, “The king is dead!
Long live the king!”—a recognition that the royal mantle survives the
death of its holder and the name “king” becomes animated by a new
person.14 The same proclamation fits this moment of constitutional
transition, in which the original spirit of Miranda is gone but a new
spirit now animates it: Miranda is dead! Long live Miranda!15
Parts I and II are descriptive. Part I addresses the three Fifth
Amendment decisions—Powell, Thompkins, and Shatzer—and explains
how each decision reflects the principle of “fair play” in interrogation.
Part II does the same for the Sixth Amendment decisions—Montejo and
Ventris. After Montejo’s overruling of Michigan v. Jackson,16 Sixth
Amendment interrogation law features many new, open questions. Part
II thus also predicts some of the future terrain of Sixth Amendment
14. The origin of the phrase is French: Le roi est mort! Vive le roi!, which appears at least
as early as 1611, in a French manual of legal maxims. See RALPH E. GEISEY, THE ROYAL
FUNERAL CEREMONY IN RENAISSANCE FRANCE 182 (1960). The declaration signifies “the idea
that, though the physical body of the king may die . . . kingship is eternal.” DAVID POTTER, A
HISTORY OF FRANCE, 1460–1560: THE EMERGENCE OF A NATION STATE 42 (1995).
15. Like observers of a transition in the monarchy, we might proclaim this in joy and
celebration, in fear and mourning, or with mixed emotions, depending on our opinions about the
passing regime as compared to its successor.
16. 475 U.S. 625 (1985).
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interrogation law, using the principle of “fair play.”
Part III evaluates whether “fair play” in interrogations, as reflected
in the Roberts Court decisions, is indeed a fair and adequate principle
for organizing constitutional interrogation doctrine. I conclude that it is
not. The Warren Court’s decisions creating specific rules and remedies
for interrogation law have been heavily criticized from both the right
and the left.17 But the underlying premise—that suspects facing police
interrogation are vulnerable to abuse and overreaching—has proven
robust and continues to find support in decades of empirical work. The
Roberts Court’s presumption that a suspect in interrogation is an
autonomous agent capable of protecting his interests is wrong. The
resulting rules based on “fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately
protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the
guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal cases.
I. CHANGING RULES FOR FIFTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION:
PROVIDING “FAIR NOTICE,” NOT DISPELLING COERCION
The Roberts Court issued three Fifth Amendment interrogation
decisions, one touching on each of the three central components of the
Miranda regime: warnings (Florida v. Powell), waivers (Berghuis v.
Thompkins), and invocations (Maryland v. Shatzer). In Florida v.
Powell, the Court continued its pattern of permitting Miranda warnings
that put a suspect on notice of his basic rights to silence and counsel,
even though those warnings do not track Miranda’s language exactly
and may not fully inform a suspect of every aspect of those rights. The
Court is satisfied so long as suspects receive “fair notice” of their rights,
regardless of whether suspects are actually empowered by that notice or
whether the coercive interrogation atmosphere is meaningfully
dispelled.
In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court effectively eliminated the
17. Some have criticized from the right that Miranda was constitutionally unjustified and
is too costly. See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 199–222 (1993);
Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2006); Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 391 (1996); Paul
G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1060 (1998); Joseph D. Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L.
REV. 100, 153 (1986). Others have criticized from the left that the Warren Court correctly
diagnosed the problem but prescribed an inadequate and ineffective set of rules to remedy it.
See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1026–27 (2001); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling
Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092, 1103–04 (2003)
(reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON (2001)) (“[B]y most accounts, Miranda has been a spectacular
failure.”).
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“affirmative waiver” requirement from Miranda. As in Powell, the
Court spent little effort ensuring that the coercive effects of custodial
interrogation are dispelled; instead, the Court put the onus on suspects
to protect themselves once they have received “fair notice” of their
interrogation rights.
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court limited how long a suspect’s
Miranda invocation of the right to counsel lasts: the invocation now
lasts fourteen days after release from Miranda custody. Of the three
cases, Shatzer speaks most in Miranda’s language of dispelling
potential coercion. Shatzer, in particular, recognized the danger in
police “badgering” a suspect to give up her rights after the suspect has
initially asserted them. Somewhat remarkably for a Court seemingly
intent on weakening what it has called the Warren Court’s
“prophylactic” rules—rules the Court has said are not part of the
Constitution itself but which are designed to preventatively protect
against violations of constitutional rights—the Shatzer Court created a
new fourteen-day “prophylactic” rule to satisfy its antibadgering
concern. Only Justice Clarence Thomas, partly concurring, would
eliminate even this protection.
Taken together, these three decisions illustrate the emerging shape
of the Fifth Amendment’s interrogation rules when reformulated to
reflect “fair play” in interrogation.
A. Florida v. Powell and Berghuis v. Thompkins: Transforming
Miranda into a “Fair Notice” Right
While Powell and Thompkins relate to different aspects of the
Miranda regime, both decisions reflect a broader theme: a Court
unconcerned with protecting vulnerable suspects from the pressures of
custodial interrogation and satisfied so long as police give a suspect
“fair notice” of his rights.
1. Florida v. Powell
In Florida v. Powell, the first interrogation case of the Roberts
Court’s October 2009 term, the Court continued its pattern of approving
Miranda warnings that deviate from the precise language articulated in
Miranda itself, a trend bemoaned by many commentators,18 with
18. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalization of
Criminal Procedure, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1992) (“To the extent that Prysock and Eagan are
utilized, either intentionally or inadvertently, the effectiveness of Miranda as an insulator is
undercut.”); Paul Marcus, A Return to the “Bright Line Rule” of Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 93, 129 (1993) (“No deviation from Miranda should be allowed unless the government
clearly can demonstrate that the deviation would not lead to confusion regarding the required
warnings, a difficult burden to sustain and certainly one that the government could not have
sustained in either Prysock or Duckworth.”); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A
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apparently little effect on the Court.19 The Court had previously
approved variations from the exact language of Miranda in California v.
Prysock20 and Duckworth v. Eagan.21 Those decisions, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote, “inform our judgment here” in Powell.22
In Prysock, the “officer informed the suspect of his right to a
lawyer’s presence during questioning and his right to counsel appointed
at no cost,” but did not explain “that the appointment of an attorney
would occur prior to the impending interrogation.”23 The Court held that
these warnings were constitutionally sufficient, as the warnings did not
suggest “any limitation on the right to the presence of appointed
counsel.”24 In Duckworth, the officer informed the suspect of the right
to counsel during the interrogation and the right to an appointed
attorney, but added that the attorney would be appointed “if and when
you go to court.”25 The Court, noting that this statement accurately
described the procedure under state law (a lawyer would first be
appointed at the first court appearance), held that this addition “simply
anticipates [a] question” the suspect may well ask.26 Again, the Court
held the warning was constitutionally sufficient.
In the wake of Prysock and Duckworth, a circuit split developed on
one particular feature of the Miranda warning: whether the warning
needed to inform the accused that he not only had a right to counsel, but
that he had a right to counsel during police questioning. Before Powell,
Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 88 (1989)
(“[A]fter Duckworth, the warnings designed to advise defendants of their rights may instead be
used to mislead them and to induce ignorant waivers.”); Thompson, supra note 11, at
657 (stating that cases like Prysock or Duckworth “have indeed turned Miranda’s ‘safeguards’
into a minor formality that is not likely to impede the path to interrogation and may in fact be a
useful interrogation tool” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))); Michael L.
Scheier, Case Note, Miranda Warnings and Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court’s Erosion of
Prisoners’ Fifth Amendment Rights in Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989), 59 U. CIN.
L. REV. 261, 282 (1990). But see Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation:
Encouraging Reliable Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1,
97–98 (2006) (proposing a revised Miranda warning and relying on Prysock and Duckworth as
support for the flexibility the Court has allowed in formulating Miranda warnings); Lawrence
Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not Perfect,
10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 598 (2007) (defending Prysock and Duckworth as consistent with the
point that “any advice that enables a suspect to make a knowing and intelligent decision about
Fifth Amendment rights will comport with constitutional standards”).
19. The Powell majority does not cite or address any of the academic criticism of its past
decisions in this area.
20. 453 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1981) (per curiam).
21. 492 U.S. 195, 200–01 (1989).
22. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010).
23. Id. (citing Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356–59).
24. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360–61.
25. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 197–98.
26. Id. at 204.
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“[t]he Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits . . . interpreted Miranda to
require an explicit warning of the right to have counsel present during
questioning.”27 In contrast, “the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits [did] not require the police to explicitly inform the suspect of
his right to have counsel present during the interrogation to satisfy
Miranda requirements.”28 Commentators urged the Supreme Court to
resolve this issue, and the Court did so in Powell.29
In Powell, the officers informed Powell that he had “the right to talk
to a lawyer before answering any . . . questions,” that if he could not
afford a lawyer, “one [would] be appointed for [him] without cost and
before any questioning[,]” and that he had “the right to use any of these
rights at any time [he] want[ed] during this interview.”30 The Court, in a
7-2 opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held that these warnings “reasonably
conveyed Powell’s right to have an attorney present, not only at the
outset of interrogation, but at all times.”31
In Powell, as in Prysock and Duckworth, the Court did not narrow
the substance of the warnings required by Miranda. For example, the
Court did not hold that the warnings need not convey the suspect’s right
to have counsel present “during the interrogation.” Instead, the Court
reiterated that “[t]he four warnings Miranda requires are invariable,”
but the specific words required to convey that “essential information”

27. Daria K. Boxer, Comment, Miranda with Precision: Why the Current Circuit Split
Should Be Solved in Favor of a Uniform Requirement of an Explicit Miranda Warning of the
Right to Have Counsel Present During Interrogation, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 425, 425 (2008) (citing
United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 140–42 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d
610, 615 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672–74 (10th Cir. 1981);
Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968)).
28. Id. at 425–26 (citing United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81–82 (4th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 501–04 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Adams, 484
F.2d 357, 361–62 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 698–99 (2d Cir.
1968)).
29. Before Powell, some commentators urged the Court to resolve the split by requiring
an explicit warning of the right to counsel during police interrogation. See Adam S. Bazelon,
Comment, Adding (or Reaffirming) a Temporal Element to the Miranda Warning “You Have the
Right to an Attorney,” 90 MARQ. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2007) (arguing “that both the Fifth
Amendment and Miranda dictate that a suspect must be explicitly made aware of the right to
have an attorney present during interrogation”); Boxer, supra note 27, at 426 (“An explicit
warning of the right to have an attorney present during the actual interrogation is essential to the
proper functioning of the Miranda safeguards . . . .”). Others argued that “a suspect’s confession
[should] not be excluded from evidence merely because police fail to expressly inform him of
his right to have counsel present during police questioning.” Derek Bottcher, Note, Bridgers v.
Dretke: Not Everything You Say Can and Will Be Used Against You, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 359, 387 (2008).
30. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010) (quoting Joint Appendix at 3, Powell,
130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175)).
31. Id. at 1205.
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are not.32 The Court held that Miranda did require a warning that
“reasonably conveyed” to the suspect the right to have counsel present
during the interrogation, but also held that Florida’s warning—which
did not explicitly so state—“communicated [that] same essential
message.”33
One of the most notable features of the Powell opinion is the
absence of any reference to the growing body of empirical research on
suspects’ poor comprehension of various versions of Miranda warnings.
Professor Charles D. Weisselberg, noting the Court’s trend of approving
variations on Miranda warnings without regard to “whether officers
phrased them in language that defendants can really understand[,]”
recently concluded that “[t]he best evidence is now that a significant
percentage of suspects simply cannot comprehend the warnings or the
rights they are intended to convey.”34 In the Powell litigation, a number
of briefs in support of Respondent Powell pointed the Court directly to
this evidence; for instance, the amicus brief of the Florida Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers relied heavily on studies showing the
relatively poor literacy and comprehension skills of criminal suspects,
as well as studies showing relatively poor levels of comprehension of
Miranda rights. That amicus brief noted that since Miranda, “numerous
studies have examined whether criminal defendants are, in fact,
understanding their Miranda rights.”35 The brief also noted that “the one
conclusion on which all of the studies agree is that the clarity of
Miranda warnings matters.”36
The Supreme Court did not dispute the quality of these studies,
discuss other reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, or explain
them away in some other fashion. Instead, the Court disregarded the
studies entirely. The Court’s failure to cite or discuss these empirical
studies suggests that the Court is not primarily interested in whether
suspects actually comprehend the substance of the Miranda warnings.
Instead, as discussed at greater length below, the Court is simply trying
to ensure that suspects receive “fair notice” of their rights, without
concerning itself with whether that notice actually dispels any inherent
32. Id. at 1204.
33. Id. at 1205–06.
34. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1563–64.
35. Brief for the Florida Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 6, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175) (citing Richard Rogers, A
Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing . . . Emerging Miranda Research and Professional Roles
for Psychologists, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 776, 777 (2008); Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of
Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177,
178–79 (2007); and Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American
Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 125–26
(2008)).
36. Id.
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coercion in custodial interrogation.
2. Berghuis v. Thompkins
In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court addressed the “waiver” prong of
Miranda, holding that “[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda
warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an
accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the
right to remain silent.”37 In addition, the Court held that “after giving a
Miranda warning, police may interrogate a suspect who has neither
invoked nor waived his or her Miranda rights”—that is, if a suspect has
not affirmatively invoked his right to remain silent, the police do not
need to obtain a waiver before they begin to question the suspect.38 In
these two parts of Thompkins, the Court completed the ongoing
rejection of several key parts of the original Miranda decision.
In Miranda, the Court stated fairly explicitly that a suspect would
have to affirmatively waive his right to silence and right to counsel
before police could obtain an admissible confession. The Court stated,
“a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel[,]” and “a
valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a
confession was in fact eventually obtained.”39
Professor Yale Kamisar has noted that “[a]lthough ‘[t]he tone and
language of the majority opinion in Miranda seemed to indicate that the
Court would be receptive to nothing short of an express waiver of the
rights involved,’ the post-Warren Court settled for less—far less.”40 The
Court soon began to retreat from its strong language in North Carolina
v. Butler,41 holding that “[a]n express written or oral statement of
waiver . . . is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish
waiver.”42 The Court said, “mere silence is not enough” to waive
Miranda rights, but it may be possible that “the defendant’s silence,
coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct
indicating waiver,” might “support a conclusion that a defendant has

37. 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261–62 (2010).
38. Id. at 2264.
39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
40. Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It,
How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 180 (2007) (quoting 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 580 (2d ed.
1999)).
41. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
42. Id. at 373.
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waived his rights.”43 Thompkins goes a significant step further, holding
that the suspect’s answer to a question—that is, the confession itself
(the single word “yes” in Thompkins)44—can constitute the “course of
conduct indicating waiver” referenced in Butler.45
In the wake of Butler, commentators argued that any “affirmative
waiver” requirement effectively had been eliminated. As early as 1988,
Professor Mark Berger observed, “In practice, it appears that as long as
the warnings are given and the suspect exhibits no overt signs of a lack
of capacity to understand them, his waiver will be upheld.”46 Professor
George C. Thomas III reaffirmed this description more recently. Based
on his “reading [of] hundreds of appellate opinions deciding whether
the police complied with Miranda[,]” he concludes that “once the
prosecutor proves that the warnings were given in a language that the
suspect understands,” courts find a Miranda waiver if “the suspect
answered police questions after saying that he understood the
warnings.”47 From my point of view as a criminal defense lawyer from
2006 through 2009, there was a bit more left of the “waiver”
requirement in those years than Berger and Thomas claim, although it is
certainly true that Butler had significantly eased the prosecutor’s
burden. A case like Thompkins, in which the defendant had not said
anything remotely resembling a waiver before confessing, would have
been subject to a robust suppression motion. The admissibility of the
confession would have been uncertain, and there is a good chance the
prosecutor would have offered a favorable plea bargain to avoid
litigating the issue.48 But that is now a historical debate. After
Thompkins, Thomas’s description of Miranda “practice” is now
formally a part of the Court’s black-letter law: “Where the prosecution
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by
the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied
waiver of the right to remain silent.”49
In Thompkins, police in Ohio arrested Van Chester Thompkins, a
suspect in a shooting that had occurred about a year earlier in
43. Id.
44. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2010).
45. Id. at 2263 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1063
(1988).
47. George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the
Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2001).
48. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Thompkins is one example that the waiver requirement
still retained some vitality. In the decision reversed by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit had
held that Thompkins had not waived his Miranda rights and thus was entitled to habeas relief.
Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
49. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/4

12

Witmer-Rich: Interrogation and the Roberts Court

2011]

INTERROGATION AND THE ROBERTS COURT

1201

Southfield, Michigan. Southfield police arrived in Ohio and interrogated
Thompkins for about three hours, starting around 1:30 p.m. The officers
presented Thompkins with a Miranda form, had him read one of the
warnings aloud, and then read him the remaining warnings.50
Thompkins did not sign a waiver form, never orally stated that he would
waive his rights, and never said anything along the lines of, “I will talk
to you.”51 Nor did Thompkins affirmatively invoke his right to silence
or right to counsel. Instead, Thompkins was “‘[l]argely’ silent during
the interrogation,” giving a “few limited verbal responses . . . such as
‘yeah,’ ‘no,’ or ‘I don’t know.’”52 He nodded his head a few times, and
once said he “‘didn’t want a peppermint’ that was offered to him by the
police and that the chair he was ‘sitting in was hard.’”53
The Court described the critical part of the interrogation as follows:
About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation,
[Detective] Helgert asked Thompkins, “Do you believe in
God?” Thompkins made eye contact with Helgert and said
“Yes,” and his eyes “well[ed] up with tears.” Helgert asked,
“Do you pray to God?” Thompkins said, “Yes.” Helgert
asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that
boy down?” Thompkins answered “Yes” and looked
away.54
Thompkins declined to make a written confession, and the interrogation
ended soon after.55
In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that
Thompkins had waived his right to remain silent. Noting Butler’s
holding that some “course of conduct” on the part of the suspect might
indicate waiver, the Court held that Thompkins’ answer “Yes” was
itself enough: “Thompkins’s answer to [Detective] Helgert’s question
about praying to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim [is]
sufficient to show a course of conduct indicating waiver [of the right to
remain silent].”56
In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that “[t]he main
purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an accused is advised of and
understands the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.”57 Thus,
instead of referring to the “inherent coercion” of custodial interrogation,
50. Id. at 2256.
51. Cf. Butler, 441 U.S. at 371 (finding a Miranda waiver for a suspect who said, “I will
talk to you but I am not signing any form”).
52. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
53. Id. at 2256–57.
54. Id. at 2257 (citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2263.
57. Id. at 2261.
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the majority described Miranda’s purpose as informational: providing a
suspect with notice of her rights. The Thompkins majority’s only
reference to the “inherent coercion” of the interrogation room is a
quotation of Moran v. Burbine to the effect that the informational
aspects of Miranda—delivering the warnings—fully dispel any
coercion: “But ‘as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the rights to
remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.’”58
Thompkins also argued that “even if his answer to Detective Helgert
could constitute a waiver of his right to remain silent, the police were
not allowed to question him until they obtained a waiver first.”59 This
argument—like the requirement of an affirmative waiver—finds good
support in Miranda itself. As Charles Weisselberg noted, “The Miranda
Court assumed that warnings would be given and waivers obtained
prior to the start of questioning or the application of the tactics
described in the Miranda opinion.”60 The Thompkins Court expressly
found the contrary, reasoning that “‘the primary protection afforded
suspects subject[ed] to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings
themselves.’”61 Accordingly, police must first “have given the accused a
Miranda warning.”62 Once the warning has been given, however,
“police may interrogate a suspect who has neither invoked nor waived
his or her Miranda rights,” and see whether the suspect eventually
provides an “express or implied waiver.”63 Given the Court’s ruling that
simply answering a question after nearly three hours of questioning can
itself be an implied waiver, this holding means that for a suspect who
has neither waived nor invoked her rights, the police can continue to
interrogate her until she confesses.
Commentators have long noted that Miranda’s protective regime
consists, at its core, of two elements: warnings and waivers.64 The
58. Id. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)). Contrast this with
the dissent in Thompkins, which takes pains to emphasize that Miranda is “premised on the idea
that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive,” so “[r]equiring proof of a course of conduct
beyond the inculpatory statements themselves is critical to ensuring that those statements are
voluntary admissions and not the dubious product of an overborne will.” Id. at 2272–73
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2263 (majority opinion).
60. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1547 (emphasis added). Weisselberg added, “The
Court assumed, I believe, that the ‘heavy burden’ to show waiver would create a ‘time out’ prior
to interrogation, during which well-informed and unpressured suspects could decide whether to
speak.” Id. at 1529.
61. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460
(1994) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
62. Id. at 2264.
63. Id.
64. Allen, supra note 17, at 74–75 (referring to “Miranda v. Arizona’s substitution of a
warning and waiver regime” for the due process “voluntariness” test); Kamisar, supra note 40,
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Thompkins decision pares down that “familiar regime of warnings and
waivers”65 by effectively eliminating the “waiver” requirement, which
changes Miranda’s protections significantly. As Yale Kamisar has
noted, “‘if the privilege is easily waived, there is really no privilege at
all.’”66 In Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s words, the Thompkins majority
“overrules sub silentio an essential aspect of the protections Miranda
has long provided for the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination.”67
3. Miranda Is Now About “Fair Notice,” Not Dispelling Coercion
In both Powell and Thompkins, the Court displayed relative
indifference to whether the defendants had genuinely escaped or
overcome the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation. Rather than
focus on the suspect’s perspective and whether the suspect received
warnings that fully ensured he comprehended his rights (Powell) and
was adequately empowered to avoid questioning unless he affirmatively
chose it (Thompkins), the Court focused on whether the police had
provided adequate notice to the defendant of his basic rights to have a
lawyer present and to remain silent.68 Both decisions reflect an ongoing
reorientation of Miranda of the sort previously described by George
Thomas: away from the anticoercion concern that clearly motivated the
Miranda Court and toward a more pared down, due process-like
“notice” function.69
Through Thompkins and Powell, the Roberts Court has continued
this transformation of Miranda, showing that Miranda is no longer
primarily about dispelling the inherent coercion of the interrogation
room. Now, Miranda is more akin to due process, simply ensuring that
“the decision of whether to answer police questions [is] up to
presumably autonomous agents who have been given information about
the consequences of answering.”70
at 172 (explaining that instead of “condition[ing] custodial police questioning on the presence of
counsel[, Miranda] conditions it . . . on the giving of certain warnings by the police and the
obtaining of waivers of certain rights from custodial suspects”) (emphasis added); Weisselberg,
supra note 11, at 1521 (“Miranda’s familiar regime of warnings and waivers was intended to
afford custodial suspects an informed and unfettered choice between speech and silence and, at
the same time, prevent involuntary statements.”).
65. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1521.
66. Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME
33 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) (quoting Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Does
It Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 459, 477 (1953)).
67. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
68. See supra Section I.A.
69. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1083, 1087.
70. Id. at 1106.
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Thomas argues, “Courts have transformed Miranda from a case
about the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination to one
about due process.”71 Miranda’s “long life”—and thus perhaps its
continued validity—may be rooted in our legal culture’s assumption
that Americans are “autonomous agents capable of acting in their own
best interests.”72 This autonomy requires “at least some level of
information about the consequences of conduct before one acts in a way
that causes a right to be lost”—that is, it entails being informed of one’s
rights before choosing what to do in the interrogation room.73 Miranda,
reformulated as a “fair notice” regime, leaves “the decision of whether
to answer police questions up to presumably autonomous agents who
have been given information about the consequences of answering.”74
Thompkins and Powell add significantly to the evidence
“suggest[ing] that Miranda is not really about the Fifth Amendment
privilege”—at least, not anymore.75 Instead, today,
Miranda is about fair notice that suspects have no duty to
answer police questions. Once the police give that notice,
the basic rationale of Miranda is satisfied and everyone is
happy. The suspect gets the notice he deserves, the police
get a statement, the prosecutor gets a conviction, and the
appellate court will affirm (as long as the suspect
understands the language in which the warnings are
given).76
As the Powell Court recognized, Powell is a continuation of the
Court’s earlier decisions in Prysock and Duckworth.77 Thomas observed
that Duckworth supported his view “[t]hat Miranda is more about due
process notice than neutralizing inherent compulsion.”78 As noted
above, the Court in Duckworth approved warnings that told suspects
they had a right to a lawyer, but “[w]e have no way of giving you a
lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you
go to court.”79 The danger with this warning, Thomas notes, “is that the
warnings seem to promise an appointed lawyer only if the suspect is
arraigned at some later time. . . . [I]f the principal function of [Miranda]
warnings is to dispel the inherent compulsion of police interrogation,
71. Id. at 1083.
72. Id. at 1106.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1102.
76. Id.
77. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010).
78. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1107.
79. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989) (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843
F.2d 1554, 1555–56 (7th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the warnings in Duckworth don’t seem particularly well fitted for the
job.”80 In contrast, if “the principal idea” of the warnings “is to provide
notice that a suspect does not have to answer and notice that his answers
can be used against him in court, [the Duckworth] warnings work just
fine.”81
The same is true of Powell. If the Court were truly concerned with
neutralizing the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, the
Court should be more concerned with the substance of the warnings. In
addition, the Court should be keenly interested in empirical research
suggesting that many suspects misinterpret or do not understand
Miranda warnings. In Powell, however, the Court ignored that research
entirely.
Charles Weisselberg notes that “[a] central assumption of the
Miranda Court was that suspects would understand the warnings and be
able to act on them.”82 When Miranda was decided, the “Court had no
empirical evidence to suggest that standardized warnings would be
effective.”83 By the time of Powell, however, the Court was presented
with ample “evidence strongly suggest[ing] the contrary, at least for a
substantial number of suspects.”84 But the Court no longer seems to care
about the effectiveness of the warning in dispelling the inherent
coerciveness of custodial interrogation. Weisselberg notes that the
Court’s “continued and almost religious belief that any form of warning
that ‘covers the bases’ will indeed be effective in informing suspects of
their rights” seems unjustified, given the “remarkable proliferation in
the variations of warnings,” and the growing empirical evidence that
many suspects do not fully understand Miranda warnings.85 But perhaps
the answer is that dispelling coercion is not what the Court wants
Miranda to do anymore.
Powell instead suggests the Court is not mainly concerned with
whether most suspects have fully comprehended and appreciated the
power of their interrogation rights. The Court is satisfied with the more
limited goal of ensuring that police have put the defendant on notice of
his rights—whether or not that notice is really understood and
appreciated.
Thompkins likewise makes much more sense if one assumes the
Court is interested in ensuring suspects receive “fair notice” of their
rights, rather than ensuring that suspects are genuinely empowered in
the custodial interrogation environment. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Thomas, supra note 47, at 1107–08.
Id. at 1108.
Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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accused the majority of “ignor[ing] the important interests Miranda
safeguards[,]” and stated the majority’s decision “bodes poorly for the
fundamental principles that Miranda protects.”86 Insofar as the Miranda
protections were originally intended to dispel the “inherently coercive”
nature of “custodial interrogation” so as to “ensur[e] [that an accused’s]
statements are voluntary admissions and not the dubious product of an
overborne will,”87 Justice Sotomayor’s criticisms are well-grounded.
Indeed, the majority did little to respond to this critique, perhaps
because it is true but now misplaced: Miranda is no longer primarily
about dispelling the inherent coercion of the interrogation room, but
now serves a due process-like “notice” function, ensuring that “the
decision of whether to answer police questions [is] up to presumably
autonomous agents who have been given information about the
consequences of answering.”88
The formal logic of the Thompkins majority opinion accepts that
Miranda is about providing notice and dispelling coercion. As a
practical matter, however, the majority is now willing to simply assume
the latter—that any coercion is in fact dispelled—whenever adequate
notice is provided. Thus, the majority says “[t]he main purpose of
Miranda is to ensure that an accused is advised of and understands the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel.”89 Once the warnings
have been provided, the majority simply assumes any inherent coercion
is automatically dispelled: “as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the
rights to remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.”90
The Court’s other conclusion in Thompkins, that “police may
interrogate a suspect who has neither invoked nor waived his or her
Miranda rights,”91 also makes more sense based on the “fair notice”
theory. Weisselberg, writing just before Thompkins was decided, noted
that when police continue to question a suspect who has not waived his
Miranda rights, “it would be difficult to continue to assume that
warnings and waivers take place in an atmosphere where compelling
pressures are minimized.”92 It is hard to see how permitting police to
86. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2272–73.
88. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1106.
89. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
90. Id. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Contrast this with the dissent, which takes pains to emphasize that Miranda is
“premised on the idea that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive,” so “[r]equiring proof
of a course of conduct beyond the inculpatory statements themselves is critical to ensuring that
those statements are voluntary admissions and not the dubious product of an overborne will.” Id.
at 2272–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2264 (majority opinion).
92. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1563.
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interrogate a defendant who remains largely silent for three hours is
consistent with an overriding concern about the inherent coercion of the
interrogation room. But if the core purpose of Miranda is “fair notice,”
then it makes sense that once police have provided notice, they are free
to question the suspect even without an affirmative waiver.
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor accused the majority of creating “a
new general principle of law” that “flatly contradict[s] [the Court’s]
longstanding views.”93 She stated that “[r]arely do this Court’s
precedents provide clearly established law so closely on point with the
facts of a particular case.”94 Under Miranda and Butler, courts “must
presume that a defendant did not waive his right[s],” that “mere silence”
in response to questioning is “not enough,”95 and that “waiver may not
be presumed ‘simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained.’”96
The majority, struggling to distinguish Thompkins from those prior
statements, drew the following fine distinction to explain implied
waiver. The majority first conceded that “[i]f the State establishes that a
Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced
statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a
valid waiver’ of Miranda rights.”97 Something else is needed. That
something, the majority explains, is simply the “additional showing that
the accused understood these rights.”98 Thus, “[w]here the prosecution
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by
the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied
waiver of the right to remain silent.”99
The key factor distinguishing an invalid waiver of the sort ruled out
by Miranda and Butler—warnings and an eventual confession—from a
valid waiver under Thompkins, is evidence that the warning “was
understood by the accused.”100 Given the seemingly critical role being
played by the defendant’s “understanding” of his rights, what sort of
“understanding” does the Court seem to have in mind? In Powell, the
Court was singularly unconcerned with evidence of how persons
actually comprehend and appreciate the full panoply of rights
recognized by Miranda: so long as the defendant is put on notice of his
basic rights, Miranda is satisfied. In Thompkins, the evidence that
Thompkins “understood” his Miranda rights is rather slim. The Court
93. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2270.
95. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
96. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
97. Id. at 2261 (majority opinion) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2262.
100. Id.
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only wrote in the negative: “There is no basis in this case to conclude
that he did not understand his rights[,]” and “there is no contention that
Thompkins did not understand his rights[.]”101 The actual “evidence”
that Thompkins “understood” his rights is simply the absence of
evidence that he did not understand them: “Thompkins received a
written copy of the Miranda warnings; Detective Helgert determined
that Thompkins could read and understand English; and Thompkins was
given time to read the warnings. Thompkins, furthermore, read aloud
the fifth warning . . . .”102 Notwithstanding the Court’s ruling that
Thompkins’ understanding (or lack thereof) serves as the lynchpin
distinguishing his waiver from the type of waiver ruled out in Miranda
and Butler, the Court does not seem overly concerned with the
robustness of that understanding.
Again, the majority’s approach in Thompkins—like its relative
indifference to actual “understanding” in Powell—shows that the Court
is not really concerned that a suspect achieve a full and genuine
comprehension of her rights. “Understanding” in both cases simply
means that the police provided the defendant with “fair notice.”
Due process rules requiring “fair notice” often place, or imply, some
level of responsibility on the audience to figure out the notice provided.
Analogously, George Thomas notes that under due process principles,
“[t]he prisoner facing loss of good time credits and the parolee facing
parole revocation can waive the right to a hearing by simply not
appearing after notice has been given.”103 In those contexts, due process
is satisfied so long as “the prisoner and the parolee had notice and failed
to exercise the right about which they were notified.”104 Thus, due
process “fair notice” rules generally do not inquire whether most or all
of the intended audience actually received and comprehended the
notice, but rather whether they had a reasonable opportunity to do so, if
they took some initiative as responsible citizens to ascertain and
understand the information being made available. Procedural due
process is widely understood “at a minimum” to “require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.”105
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1099.
104. Id. at 1100.
105. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (observing that procedural due process is “the right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard . . . ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’” (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal
Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006) (noting the procedural due process
requirement that “a person may not constitutionally be deprived of ‘life, liberty or property’ by
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The due process-like “fair notice” feature is evident in Powell and
Thompkins: both operate with a conception of “understanding”
concerned primarily with whether police have given the suspects notice
and a reasonable opportunity to understand and exercise their rights. But
the Court was not concerned with whether suspects—often of low
intelligence and relatively uneducated—actually comprehend their
rights or are affirmatively empowered to assert them.
B. Maryland v. Shatzer: Miranda’s Expiration Date and a New
Prophylactic Antibadgering Rule
The Roberts Court’s other Fifth Amendment decision, Maryland v.
Shatzer, placed an “expiration date” on a suspect’s invocation of his
right to counsel in a custodial interrogation.106 Shatzer was written
against the backdrop of Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona.107 Under
Miranda, a suspect in custodial interrogation can invoke either the Fifth
Amendment right to silence or the Fifth Amendment right to counsel (or
both).108 In either case, once the suspect has invoked the right to silence
or counsel, “interrogation must cease.”109 If the suspect invokes the
right to silence, police must cease the interrogation, but may reapproach
after some period of time and again ask the defendant to waive his
rights.110
The rule is different if the defendant invokes his right to counsel. In
Edwards, the Court held that “when an accused has invoked his right to
have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of
that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to
further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights.”111 When a defendant has invoked his right to
counsel, he has communicated to police that “he is not capable of
undergoing . . . questioning without advice of counsel,” and thus a later
waiver is presumed to be the subject of the inherently compelling

governmental action without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”); Martin H.
Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475 (1986) (“[T]he Supreme Court has often stated that the core
rights of due process are notice and hearing . . . .”).
106. 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1227 (2010).
107. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966).
109. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74).
110. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1975) (holding that there was no
Miranda violation when officers “gave full ‘Miranda warnings’ to [the person in custody] at the
very outset of each interrogation, subjected him to only a brief period of initial questioning, and
suspended questioning entirely for a significant period before beginning the interrogation that
led to his incriminating statement”).
111. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
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pressures of custodial interrogation.112 As Justice Antonin Scalia
explained in Shatzer, “[t]he Edwards presumption of involuntariness
ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive
pressures of ‘prolonged police custody,’ by repeatedly attempting to
question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is
‘badgered into submission.’”113 Invocations of the right to counsel
during custodial interrogation bar future questioning about any offense,
not just the offense that prompted the initial invocation.114
In Shatzer, all members of the Court agreed on the fundamental
problem: without some endpoint, “every Edwards prohibition of
custodial interrogation of a particular suspect would be eternal[,]” and
would include interrogations pertaining to “a different crime” and those
conducted “by a different law enforcement authority.”115 At oral
argument in Shatzer, Justice Samuel Alito posed what he called “an
extreme hypothetical”:
Someone is taken into custody in Maryland in 1999 and
questioned for joy riding, released from custody, and then
in 2009 is taken into custody and questioned for murder in
Montana.
Now, at the time of the first questioning, the . . . suspect
invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Now, does
the Edwards rule apply to the second interrogation? 116
Petitioner’s counsel answered “Yes,”117 which prompted Professor
Susan Bandes to note, “[i]f so, Edwards’ days are numbered.”118
112. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988).
113. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (citations omitted) (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686 and
id. at 690 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), respectively).
114. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677–78.
115. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222; see also id. at 1228 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(“I agree that the presumption from Edwards . . . is not ‘eternal.’” (citations omitted) (quoting
id. at 1222 (majority opinion))).
116. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680)
[hereinafter Shatzer Transcript], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/08-680.pdf.
117. Id. at 32. Justice Alito later posed an even more extreme hypothetical:
Let me pose you my hypothetical again, the same joy riding questioning, and
then 40 years later after the person has gotten a law degree and become an
entrepreneur and made $20 million, he’s taken into custody and questioned by
the Federal authorities for stock fraud. Forever, you know, this right that was
invoked back in adolescence continues forever.
Id. at 34. Petitioner’s counsel replied, “It should.” Id.
118. Susan A. Bandes, Bright Line Fever: The Argument in Maryland v. Shatzer, ACS
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.acslaw.org/node/14305.
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Given the agreement that Edwards invocation should not be
“eternal,” the Court’s task in Shatzer was to craft a specific rule limiting
the invocation in some way. The Court did so by adopting a rule that
Edwards invocations of the right to counsel end fourteen days after the
suspect’s release from Miranda/Edwards police custody. Thus, a
defendant like Shatzer who was released from the interrogation room
back into the general prison population is no longer in “custody” for
Miranda/Edwards purposes.119
Rather than create this fourteen-day rule, the Court could have held
that the prohibition on talking to a suspect who invoked the right to
counsel ended the instant the suspect was released from custody. The
“end of custody” rule had been accepted by many lower courts120 and
was noted as a possibility by Justice Thomas, who concurred in part.121
Instead, the Court created a new Fifth Amendment “prophylactic” rule:
once a suspect invoked his right to counsel, police could attempt to
reinterrogate him only after a fourteen-day break in Miranda custody.
The Court settled on fourteen days because, according to Justice Scalia,
“[i]t seems to us” to be the right length of time.122
This new rule is designed to prevent police from “coerc[ing] or
badger[ing] [a suspect] into abandoning his earlier refusal to be
questioned” without the presence of counsel.123 The fourteen-day period
protects the suspect against police badgering by “provid[ing] plenty of
time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult
with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects
of his prior custody.”124
Thus, the Court in Shatzer did not choose the least suspect-friendly
rule. It was willing to create a new “prophylactic” rule (albeit one with a
fairly short fuse) to prevent a particular evil: police badgering of a
suspect who has already invoked his rights. While the Roberts Court’s
interrogation decisions show little concern for protecting suspects from
119. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223–24.
120. Id. at 1220 (“Lower courts have uniformly held that a break in custody ends the
Edwards presumption . . . .” (citing People v. Storm, 52 P.3d 52, 61–62 n.6 (Cal. 2002))).
121. Id. at 1227–28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Notably, Justice Thomas did not
actually express the view that the Edwards presumption should even last until the end of
Miranda custody. Justice Thomas, showing his continued willingness to overrule precedent,
stated, “It is not apparent to me that the presumption of involuntariness the Court recognized in
Edwards is justifiable even in the custodial setting to which Edwards applies it.” Id. at 1227
(citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 160 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Justice
Thomas thus explained that he would not extend Edwards beyond its facts: “But even if one
believes that the Court is obliged to apply Edwards to any case involving continuing custody,
the Court’s opinion today goes well beyond that.” Id.
122. Id. at 1223–24 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 1220.
124. Id. at 1223.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 4

1212

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, the Court does seem
to retain one concern: excessive badgering by police of a suspect who
has already told them she does not want to talk, or needs a lawyer.125
The Shatzer Court’s concern about preventing police from badgering
a suspect who has already invoked his rights appears again in its Sixth
Amendment Montejo v. Louisiana decision, discussed below. This
suggests that part of the Court’s vision for “fair play” in interrogations
is respecting the voluntary choices of autonomous agents. The Court is
chipping away at or eliminating rules designed to protect what the
Warren Court viewed as the inherent vulnerabilities shared by most
interrogation suspects. But in Shatzer the Court went so far as to create
a new prophylactic rule to protect the assertion of rights by an
autonomous suspect. This same concern will be seen reflected in
Montejo below.
II. RESHAPING RULES FOR SIXTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION: “FAIR
PLAY” FOR BOTH DEFENDANTS AND PROSECUTORS
The Roberts Court issued two Sixth Amendment interrogation
decisions, Kansas v. Ventris and Montejo v. Louisiana, both written by
Justice Scalia. Montejo received more attention, as it overruled the
twenty-three-year-old precedent of Michigan v. Jackson.126 In doing so,
the Court cleared away a large portion of Sixth Amendment
interrogation law, giving the Roberts Court the opportunity and
doctrinal space to create new rules on a relatively clean slate. Ventris is
also quite important, however, not only for its holding—that statements
taken in violation of Massiah, outside the presence of counsel, can be
used to impeach a testifying defendant—but for what its reasoning
reveals about the long-opaque nature of the values underlying Sixth
Amendment interrogation limits. Together, the two decisions, like the
Roberts Court’s Fifth Amendment interrogation cases, show a Court
crafting rules to ensure “fair play” in interrogations, rather than to
protect vulnerable defendants.
A. Kansas v. Ventris: “Fair Play,” Impeaching a Defendant’s
Testimony, and Statements Obtained in Violation of the Sixth
Amendment
Kansas v. Ventris was the first decision under Chief Justice Roberts’
tenure relating to Sixth Amendment rights during police interrogation.
In Ventris, Justice Scalia, writing for a seven-member majority, held
that a defendant’s incriminating statements, even if obtained in violation
of the Sixth Amendment “strictures” imposed in Massiah v. United
125. Id. at 1220–21.
126. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009).
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States, were admissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s
later testimony at trial.127 Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, dissented.128
The Court’s holding and reasoning together reveal several notable
features about the Roberts Court’s view of the underlying nature of the
Sixth Amendment. First, Justice Stevens, in dissent, accused the Court
of reducing Massiah to a “prophylactic” rule.129 On the contrary:
Ventris actually affirms that Massiah is not a “prophylactic” rule
designed to protect some other Sixth Amendment right, but rather is
itself a part of the Sixth Amendment. Among other things, this means
that police violate the Sixth Amendment—and are potentially liable in a
§ 1983130 civil action for deprivation of rights—by intentionally
interrogating a represented, charged defendant about the charged
offense. It also means, as Justice Scalia explained, that exclusion of
statements for all potential trial purposes does not flow automatically
from a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.131
Second, the opinion suggests Massiah is based on a conception of
“fair play” in the criminal process. This is evident in the two key parts
of Ventris: first, that interrogators violate the Sixth Amendment the
moment they interrogate an uncounseled (but charged) defendant
without a waiver because to do so unfairly exploits the unequal powers
of the two parties; and second, that even when a statement is excluded
from the government’s case-in-chief, it would be unfair to allow the
defendant to take the stand and testify inconsistently with that prior
statement.132 In Ventris, then, “fair play” cuts both ways.
Explaining these points requires a brief description of the legal
landscape leading up to Ventris. Before Ventris, the Court had
consistently held that statements taken in violation of various Fifth and
Sixth Amendment “prophylactic” protections could be used to impeach
a testifying defendant. In Harris v. New York,133 the Court held that
statements taken in violation of Miranda—specifically when “no
warning of a right to appointed counsel was given before questions were
put to petitioner when he was taken into custody”—were admissible to
impeach the defendant’s trial testimony, even though inadmissible in
the prosecution’s case-in-chief.134 The Court reasoned that it would not
allow “[t]he shield provided by Miranda [to] be perverted into a license
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1844–45, 1847 (2009).
Id. at 1847.
Id. at 1848 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1847.
Id. at 1846.
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Id. at 224.
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to use perjury by way of a defense.”135 Moreover, the Court reasoned
that if the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to have “a deterrent
effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when
the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its
case in chief.”136 Any further deterrence to be gained by also excluding
confessions from use in impeachment, the Court reasoned, was
“speculative.”137
Later, in Oregon v. Hass,138 the Court applied the same rule,
permitting the prosecution to impeach the defendant with statements he
gave after invoking his Fifth Amendment right to counsel—a different
Miranda violation than the failure to give warnings in Harris.139 In
Hass, the Court acknowledged the risk created by this rule: “One might
concede that when proper Miranda warnings have been given, and the
officer then continues his interrogation after the suspect asks for an
attorney, the officer may be said to have little to lose and perhaps
something to gain by way of possibly uncovering impeachment
material.”140 The Court dismissed this as a “speculative possibility” that
did not change its conclusion.141
The Court reached the same result in the Sixth Amendment context
in Michigan v. Harvey,142 allowing the prosecution to impeach a
testifying defendant with statements obtained in violation of Michigan
v. Jackson’s rule that “after a defendant requests assistance of counsel,
any waiver of Sixth Amendment rights given in a discussion initiated by
police is presumed invalid.”143 Citing Harris and Hass,144 the Court
explained that voluntary statements may be used in impeachment even
when they are inadmissible in the government’s case-in-chief “when the
violations alleged by a defendant relate only to procedural safeguards
that are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,’ (Miranda
rules), but are instead measures designed to ensure that constitutional
rights are protected.”145
In Ventris, the Sixth Amendment violation was not a violation of
Michigan v. Jackson’s “prophylactic” rule, as in Harvey. Instead, the
statements used to impeach Ventris, the testifying defendant, were
135. Id. at 226.
136. Id. at 225.
137. Id.
138. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
139. Id. at 722–24.
140. Id. at 723.
141. Id.
142. 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
143. Id. at 349–50.
144. Id. at 350–51 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) and Haas, 420 U.S.
714 (1975)).
145. Id. at 351 (citation omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
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obtained by a jailhouse informant planted by police in Ventris’ pretrial
holding cell. Ventris was charged with felony murder and aggravated
theft, among other counts, in the robbery and shooting death of Ernest
Hicks. At trial, Ventris took the stand in his own defense and blamed
the robbery and shooting on his codefendant Rhonda Theel, who
pleaded guilty and testified against Ventris at trial.146 The State
impeached Ventris with testimony from the jailhouse informant, who
testified that Ventris had confessed to him that “[h]e’d shot this man in
his head and in his chest and taken his keys, his wallet, about $350.00,
and . . . a vehicle.”147 Notably, the jury apparently did not fully credit
this informant’s testimony, as it acquitted Ventris of felony murder. The
jury did, however, convict Ventris on aggravated burglary and
aggravated robbery charges.148
The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the jailhouse
informant had deliberately elicited this confession from Ventris, thereby
violating the rule in Massiah against deliberately eliciting statements
from a represented, charged defendant without a valid waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.149 Determining “[w]hether
otherwise excluded evidence can be admitted for purposes of
impeachment[,]” Justice Scalia explained, “depends upon the nature of
the constitutional guarantee that is violated.”150 In light of Harris, Hass,
and Harvey, the obvious route to permitting impeachment use would be
to declare Massiah a “prophylactic” rule—like Miranda and Michigan
v. Jackson—and apply the Harris-Hass-Harvey rule that “statements
taken in violation of only the prophylactic Miranda [or Jackson]
rules . . . are admissible to impeach conflicting testimony by the
defendant.”151 Professor Carol S. Steiker has observed that these prior
decisions had left:
open the door to concluding that Massiah’s ban on
questioning in the absence of counsel after the
commencement of adversary proceedings, like Miranda’s
ban on the questioning of suspects in custody in the
absence of warnings, is not an interpretation of the
Constitution, but rather a prophylactic rule designed to
sweep more broadly than the actual constitutional right in
order to deter police misconduct.152
146. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1844 (2009).
147. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 154, 150, Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (No. 07-1356), 2008
WL 4905476 at *154, *150) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1845 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)).
150. Id.
151. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
152. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
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If so, Steiker predicted, “the consequences for the Massiah rule likely
would be very similar to the consequences that have obtained already in
the Miranda context.”153 Among other things, “statements taken in
violation of Massiah likely would be permitted as impeachment against
a defendant who testified contrary to such statements at trial.”154
Recasting Massiah as a “prophylactic” rule, Steiker argues, would
constitute a “re-working of Massiah” similar to the Court’s past
constriction of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules.155
Does Ventris accomplish, in the Sixth Amendment context, the
“counter-revolution in constitutional criminal procedure” that Steiker
had observed in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments but not yet in the
Sixth Amendment? Justice Stevens seems to think so. Dissenting in
Ventris, Justice Stevens claimed that the majority’s holding “relies on
the view that a defendant’s pretrial right to counsel is merely
‘prophylactic’ in nature,” and that “any violation of this prophylactic
right occurs solely at the time the State subjects a counseled defendant
to an uncounseled interrogation, not when the fruits of the encounter are
used against the defendant at trial.”156 Justice Stevens objected to
reducing the pretrial right to counsel to a “prophylactic” right, arguing
that “[p]lacing the prophylactic label on a core Sixth Amendment right
mischaracterizes the sweep of the constitutional guarantee.”157
1. Massiah Is Not a Prophylactic Rule, and Massiah Violations Occur
at the Time of Uncounseled Interrogation
Before Ventris, commentators had long made two assertions about
Massiah: (1) it is part of the Sixth Amendment itself, not a
“prophylactic” rule;158 and (2) like the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, Massiah is violated when the statement is
introduced at trial, not at the time of interrogation.159 The Court in
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2527 (1996).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1848 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. See Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure, supra note 17, at 122–
23 (asserting that it is “erroneous” to describe the Massiah rule “as prophylactic”); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 889 (1981) (“[T]he Massiah
‘exclusionary rule’ is not merely a prophylactic device[.]”); James J. Tomkovicz, Saving
Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive Confessions Following a Deprivation of
Counsel, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 754–55 (2007) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine how the
Massiah doctrine might be recast as mere prophylactic guidelines that guard against presumed,
but not actual, right to counsel violations.”). But see Steiker, supra note 152, at 2527 (claiming
the Court has left the question “open”).
159. See Schulhofer, supra note 158, at 889 (“Massiah . . . is not intended to deter any
pretrial behavior whatsoever. Rather, Massiah explicitly permits government efforts to obtain
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Ventris confirmed the first point and rejected the second.160
As noted above, one easy route for the Court to permit impeachment
use of Massiah violations would be to declare Massiah a “prophylactic
rule”—something prior decisions had left “open.”161 The Court’s line of
cases in Harris v. New York,162 Oregon v. Hass,163 and Michigan v.
Harvey164—all permitting impeachment use by declaring the violated
right merely “prophylactic”—paved the way for that approach. But
contrary to Justice Stevens’ claim, the Ventris majority did not follow
that route.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first explained that
“[w]hether otherwise excluded evidence can be admitted for purposes of
impeachment depends upon the nature of the constitutional guarantee
that is violated. Sometimes that explicitly mandates exclusion from trial,
and sometimes it does not.”165 To illustrate, he first mentioned the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Given the nature of that
right—protection from being “compelled to give [testimony] against”
oneself—the right “is violated whenever a truly coerced confession is
introduced at trial[.]”166
Justice Scalia contrasted this with Fourth Amendment violations and
violations of “Fifth and Sixth Amendment prophylactic rules forbidding
certain pretrial . . . conduct.”167 The Fourth Amendment, for example, is
not a trial right against the use of certain evidence, but rather is a right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, the exclusion of
evidence obtained from a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic,
but rather is a remedy imposed by the Court based on a cost-benefit
analysis. Justice Scalia asserted that “[t]he same is true” for violations
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment “prophylactic” rules.168
How does a Massiah violation fit into this scheme? Rather than call
information from an indicted suspect, so long as that information is not used ‘as evidence
against him at his trial.’ . . . [I]t is the admission at trial that in itself denies the constitutional
right.”); James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and
Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REV. 751, 763 (1989) (“[A] sixth amendment violation
occur[s] at the time of, and only at the time of, admission at trial of the fruits of an uncounseled
pretrial encounter.”).
160. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1845–47.
161. Steiker, supra note 152, at 2527.
162. 401 U.S. 222, 223–26 (1971) (statements in absence of Miranda warnings could be
used to impeach).
163. 420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975) (statements after suspect invoked Miranda rights could
be used to impeach).
164. 494 U.S. 344, 345–46 (1990) (statements in violation of Michigan v. Jackson could be
used to impeach).
165. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1845.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Massiah a “prophylactic” rule, Justice Scalia explained the nature of a
Massiah violation: specifically, when police violate a defendant’s right
to counsel during a pretrial interrogation, the violation occurs at the
time of the interrogation, not upon the later admission of that evidence
at trial.169 Because the violation is complete at the time of the
interrogation, the question of admissibility at trial—as in the Fourth
Amendment context—“does not involve, therefore, the prevention of a
constitutional violation, but rather the scope of the remedy for a
violation that has already occurred.”170 Whether to permit impeachment
use of a statement obtained in violation of Massiah thus depends—like
a Fourth Amendment violation—on whether the relative costs (to the
truth-seeking process) and benefits (deterring the earlier violation)
mandate exclusion. On that point, the Court’s “precedents make clear
that the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes
is not worth the candle.”171
Thus, implicit in the Court’s reasoning is the conclusion that
Massiah violations are actual Sixth Amendment violations, not merely
violations of a “prophylactic” rule. The majority also says so fairly
explicitly: “We hold that the informant’s testimony, concededly elicited
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was admissible to challenge
Ventris’s inconsistent testimony at trial.”172
2. “Fair Play” in Interrogation and Prosecution
Beyond clarifying the nature of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, Ventris suggests that the right is based on underlying values of
“fair play” in criminal prosecution. Uncounseled pretrial interrogation
(after charging) is prohibited because it violates “fair play”—“the basic
dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes.”173 And “fair
play” is also the reason prosecutors are permitted to impeach defendants
with prior inconsistent statements, even when obtained illegally: it
would be unfair to allow a defendant to testify at his trial inconsistently
with prior statements, immune from impeachment.
In Massiah itself, and in later decisions, the Supreme Court never
provided a fully convincing explanation for why police are prohibited
from eliciting statements from a represented defendant without counsel
(or waiver of the right to counsel).174 It is clear that Massiah’s
169. Id. at 1846.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1847 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 1846 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
174. Tomkovicz, supra note 159, at 762 (“The rationale for sixth amendment suppression
is not at all clear. The Court has failed to rationalize Massiah-based exclusion with clarity or
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protections are not based primarily on the concerns originally
motivating the Miranda decision: protecting defendants from the
inherent compulsion of the interrogation room. Massiah is not triggered
by “custodial interrogation,” as Miranda is. Moreover, Massiah
prohibits the police from deliberately eliciting statements even when the
defendant does not know he is speaking to a government agent and thus
presumably can feel no compulsion from the state to speak.175
Commentators have long debated what core theory, if any, best
explains Massiah. Professor H. Richard Uviller has posited three
different conceptions of the lawyer’s role that might underlie the
decision: (1) “preparatory assistance,” (2) “preventive assistance,” and
(3) “adversarial assistance.”176 Ventris, I argue, shows the Court
endorsing the “preventive assistance” model (or what I would call “fair
play”).
Uviller explains that the fundamental idea of the first model,
“preparatory assistance,” is to “prevent[] . . . the ultimate injustice[,]”
namely “the erroneous conviction of an innocent person[,]” by
providing “help for an accused person in need.”177 Because the purpose
of this help is to prevent conviction of the innocent, the courts should
require “counsel’s special talent and concern” at any “vital juncture”
when counsel’s presence is required to “enhance the reliability of the
verdict”—for example, “counsel might assist in preserving evanescent
exculpatory evidence or by employing the mechanisms of adjudication
to obtain a valid outcome.”178 Thus, the “preparatory assistance” model
might be referred to as a “just outcome” model.
Uviller’s second model is that of counsel providing “preventive
assistance” or ensuring “fair play.” This model assumes a criminal
defendant faces an “uneven match” at the hands of the “immense forces
of the state arrayed against him.”179 As Uviller explains:
[Z]ealous counsel is the best instrument to ameliorate the
consistency, proffering deficient and potentially contradictory explanations.” (footnote
omitted)); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137,
1164 (1987) (“We are not much aided in discovering the answers by the Court’s own
explanation in the principal cases. The majority simply informs us that the reason Massiah’s and
Williams’ statements are unusable is because, though accused, the defendants were denied the
assistance of counsel and did not operatively waive their entitlement. While it is undeniable that
a lawyer might have ‘assisted’ them in the sense of reducing the culpable evidence available to
the prosecution, the Court does not justify this construction of ‘assistance’ nor explain why the
right to such assistance should depend entirely on the formalistic moment of ‘accusation.’”).
175. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07.
176. Uviller, supra note 174, at 1169–83.
177. Id. at 1169.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1173.
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inherent disadvantage of the defendant’s position and give him
a fair, fighting chance. . . . The theory of “preventive
assistance” is wholly different from the “preparatory
assistance” argument in that while the latter is designed to
promote a just result; this one is dedicated to the idea of a fair
fight.180
Other commentators have articulated theories similar to Uviller’s
“preventive assistance” model. Professors Silas Wasserstrom and
William J. Mertens claim that “Massiah . . . seems directly concerned
with the balance of litigative advantages between the prosecution and
the defense at trial[]” by “assur[ing] that prosecutors will not secure any
trial advantages from the defendant by going outside established, and
judicially regulated, channels and that the defense counsel will
participate in equal terms with the prosecutor.”181
Professor James Tomkovicz’s theory of the Sixth Amendment is also
similar to Uviller’s “preventive assistance” or “fair play” model.
Tomkovicz states, “The grant of counsel to the inherently inferior
defendant is designed to promote balanced contests by equalizing the
adversaries,” given that the prosecution in our system’s “contest
between opposing sides . . . is significantly more powerful in most, if
not all, relevant respects.”182 Counsel is thus guaranteed to promote
“‘[r]ough equality’ between the opponents,” to ensure “not only . . .
accurate and truthful results, but also . . . that those results are the
products of adversarial fair play.”183 In a later article, Tomkovicz
explains that “the Sixth Amendment’s sole original objective . . . is . . .
to equalize an accused and protect against the increased risks of
conviction that result when a defendant must deal with the legal system
or an expert adversary without a lawyer’s guidance.”184 All of these
commentators are discussing a similar notion: equalizing the process
(making it fair) by inserting counsel for the defendant.
Uviller’s third model, “adversarial assistance,” is based on the
premise that in an adversarial system, “ex parte access is anathema.”185
In an adversarial system, as opposed to an inquisitorial one, “the state
may not cross into the accused’s territory to sample the contents of the
defendant’s mind without the concurrence of the guardian of the
fortress, his legal adviser.”186 Tomkovicz also sometimes articulates
180. Id.
181. Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But
Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 175–76 (1984).
182. Tomkovicz, supra note 159, at 753.
183. Id. (footnote omitted).
184. Tomkovicz, supra note 158, at 753.
185. Uviller, supra note 174, at 1176.
186. Id. Uviller ultimately concludes that none of his three possible theories adequately
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similar purposes. He notes that Massiah protects “[c]ounsel’s advice not
to cooperate with the state by divulging inculpatory information” to the
prosecution, a rule which “guarantees that the government will shoulder
the entire burden of proving guilt without assistance from its
adversary.”187 Tomkovicz explains elsewhere that “[i]n the pretrial
setting defined by Massiah’s doctrine, legal assistance helps prevent an
accused from providing the adversary with ammunition that can seal his
fate.”188 These statements resonate with Uviller’s “adversarial
assistance” model, which is concerned with preserving the adversarial
system. For Tomkovicz, however, the core justification for preserving
the “adversarial system” seems to be ensuring “fair play”; he notes that
Massiah assures that “the accused will not be convicted on the basis of
advantages the government has secured by denying adversarial
equalization.”189 Thus for Tomkovicz, the “adversarial” values are
fundamentally about “equalization” of the contest between the parties—
that is, about fairness.
Ultimately, it seems that the “adversarial assistance” model must
collapse into one of the other two models (as it appears to do for
Tomkovicz). Recognizing that ours is an adversarial system of justice
does little to provide an ultimate explanation for whether and when
counsel must be provided. An adversarial system is not an end in
itself—it is valuable (if at all) because it serves some other goal. Thus, it
might be argued that an adversarial system is the best process for
discerning truth—that is, a just outcome.190 Alternately, it might be
argued that we value an adversarial system because that process is most
fair, in the sense of providing an equal contest (“fair play”) between the
two interested parties—the government and the accused.191 Or one
justify the Massiah rule, which he states is most likely based on (inappropriate) “judicial
discomfort with the anomalous inquisitorial component in the adversary design.” Id. at 1183.
For present purposes, however, these three models provide a useful way to analyze the Court’s
definition of the Sixth Amendment right in Ventris.
187. Tomkovicz, supra note 159, at 766–67.
188. Tomkovicz, supra note 158, at 754.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (referring to the Court’s “belief that
debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function of trials”); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (noting that effective representation by counsel “is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results”).
191. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 188–89 (1991) (Stevens, J., joined by
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (“Undergirding our entire line of cases requiring the
police to follow fair procedures when they interrogate presumptively innocent citizens
suspected of criminal wrongdoing is the longstanding recognition that an adversarial system of
justice can function effectively only when the adversaries communicate with one another
through counsel and when laypersons are protected from overreaching by more experienced and
skilled professionals. Whenever the Court ignores the importance of fair procedure in this
context and describes the societal interest in obtaining ‘uncoerced confessions’ from pretrial
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might argue that an adversarial model serves both the values of truth
and fairness.192 In any event, the “adversarial system” model seems to
have little value independent of the underlying value or values that
system is presumed to promote. Indeed, as noted below, the Court in
Ventris disregards the “adversarial assistance” model as an independent
reason for providing counsel during interrogations.
Thus, the three justifications commentators have articulated as
possibly underlying Sixth Amendment interrogation rules are (1) “just
outcome” (or “preparatory assistance”), (2) “fair play” (or “preventive
assistance”), and (3) “adversarial system” (or “adversarial assistance”).
As I will explain, the Ventris opinion rejected the “just outcome” model,
disregarded the “adversarial system” model, and offered at least
tentative endorsement of the “fair play” model.
In Ventris, Justice Scalia made several comments on the nature of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in general and the Massiah right
in particular. First, he stated that “[t]he core of the [Sixth Amendment]
right to counsel is indeed a trial right, ensuring that the prosecution’s
case is subjected to ‘the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’”193
As for the Massiah rule, the Court has “held that the right covers
pretrial interrogations to ensure that police manipulation does not render
counsel entirely impotent—depriving the defendant of ‘effective
representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him.’”194
Justice Scalia’s concern here for “police manipulation” could be
understood in at least two ways. Perhaps he means police pressure of
the sort that might lead an innocent person to make inculpatory
statements. If that is what “police manipulation” means, Justice Scalia’s
concern looks like the “preparatory assistance”/“just outcome” model,
in which counsel’s core function is to prevent conviction of the
innocent. On the other hand, “police manipulation” might also simply
mean police obtaining an unfair advantage by getting an unwary
defendant to implicate himself when a more savvy, empowered
defendant would know to keep silent and not provide the advantage to
his opponent. This understanding would suggest a “preventive
assistance”/“fair play” model, meaning the preservation of a fair playing
field—preventing police from winning the “game” before it really even
starts. Justice Scalia did not clearly explain which of these concerns (or
detainees as an ‘unmitigated good,’ the Court is revealing a preference for an inquisitorial
system of justice.” (emphasis added)).
192. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“The system assumes that
adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.”).
193. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
194. Id. (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)).
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perhaps both) he was describing.
Justice Scalia then considered the nature of the constitutional
violation in a Massiah case. According to Justice Scalia, Massiah
suggested (on the one hand) that “the violation occurred at the moment
of the postindictment interrogation because such questioning
‘contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal
causes’”195—a “fair play” model. On the other hand, Massiah also
suggested the violation only occurs when the statement is improperly
“used against the defendant at . . . trial”—a “just outcome” model.196
Faced with these two competing visions of the right, the Ventris Court
chose the former and rejected the latter: “Now that we are confronted
with the question, we conclude that the Massiah right is a right to be
free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the
interrogation.”197
Having decided that “the violation occur[s] at the moment of the
postindictment interrogation,” the Court appeared to be endorsing the
theory that Massiah is premised on the “basic dictates of fairness in the
conduct of criminal causes”198—a “fair play” rationale for Massiah and
the pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Unfortunately, the Court
did not explain its choice very well. Instead of telling the reader why the
Court chose the former option, Justice Scalia explained why the Court
rejected the latter. Justice Scalia stated that it is “illogical” to say the
violation occurs when the evidence is admitted because the right to
counsel is “not denied . . . merely because the prosecution has been
permitted to introduce evidence of guilt—even evidence so
overwhelming that the attorney’s job of gaining an acquittal is rendered
impossible.”199 Thus, even in a case in which (putting any Massiah
violation aside) the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the defendant
still has the right to the assistance of counsel. Counsel must be present
and able to fight on the defendant’s behalf, even when that fight is
obviously doomed from the start. The right might be analogized to the
right to have a coach for your baseball team, even when your Little
League team is facing the Yankees: you still have a right to a coach,
even though you will obviously lose against the overpowering and
overmatched force against you.200
Justice Scalia went on to explain that past cases have implicitly
recognized that “the assistance of counsel has been denied” at the point
195. Id. at 1846 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205).
196. Id. (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. at 1846.
200. As Uviller has noted, “it is surprisingly difficult to escape the sporting analogy” in
Sixth Amendment right to counsel discussions. Uviller, supra note 174, at 1174.
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police interrogate a charged suspect without adequate warnings and
waivers.201 In Patterson v. Illinois,202 the Court held “that the stringency
of the warnings necessary for a waiver of the assistance of counsel
varies according to ‘the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the
particular [pretrial] proceeding.’”203 That is to say, counsel is required
under the Sixth Amendment at interrogations because of “the usefulness
of counsel” at that particular stage. Invoking the “usefulness of counsel”
at interrogations again seems to reflect a “fair play” model of Sixth
Amendment rights. A lawyer is “useful” at an interrogation by
protecting the defendant from a potentially overwhelming adversary and
keeping a defendant from “giving away the farm” at this early stage
(and without the reciprocal benefit of a good plea deal). A lawyer is
“useful” in keeping the playing field fairer.
Insofar as Justice Scalia’s opinion chose the “fair play” theory of
Massiah over the “just outcome” theory, the Court’s description of the
remedy shows that the Court’s vision of “fair play” is markedly
different from that articulated by commentators. Tomkovicz argues that
if Massiah is rooted in a theory of “fair play,” then “Massiah exclusion
is akin to the suppression of statements under the Due Process and SelfIncrimination Clauses. Like those two guarantees, the Sixth
Amendment safeguards an interest in not being convicted as a result of
government methods deemed unfair by our Constitution.”204
Accordingly, a statement taken in violation of Massiah should not be
usable by the prosecution for any purpose, including impeachment.205
But the Court in Ventris decided that exclusion is not always
required as a remedy for a Massiah violation. The reason prosecutors
can impeach a testifying defendant with inconsistent pretrial statements,
even ones unfairly obtained by the police in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, is that it would be unfair to allow the defendant to
“provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.”206
Professor Donald Dripps has called this the “waiver theory” of the
Court’s past impeachment cases.207 Dripps suggests that by “taking the
stand and testifying contrary to the prior statement, [the defendant has]
waived his privilege against the use of the previously compelled
admission. . . . Thus the defendant who testifies accepts the obligation
201. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846.
202. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
203. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988)).
204. Tomkovicz, supra note 158, at 755.
205. Id.
206. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth
Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19, 29–30 (2000).
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to answer truthfully the prosecutor’s questions on cross.”208 The
defendant has “the alternative of not testifying, reinforced by an
instruction to the jury to draw no inference of guilt from standing
silent.”209 When a defendant has given a previous statement to the
police under unconstitutional circumstances or pressures, the
government cannot build its case on that statement—that would not be
fair. But it would also be unfair, the theory goes, for the defendant to
affirmatively choose to take the stand and testify inconsistently with
that prior statement.
Dripps argues that “[t]he best interpretation recognizes that coercive
questioning with the object of ultimate incrimination violates the
privilege, and that use of the evidence constitutes a separate and distinct
violation.”210 When the defendant chooses to take the stand and testify,
fairness dictates that the defendant has waived his objection to the
second violation—at least has waived the right to object if he testified
inconsistently with that prior statement.211 In that case, “[t]he pretrial
violation needs to be deterred, but the scope of the deterrent remedy is
fairly subject to policy-based qualifications just as is the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. The constitutional concern is what
happened in the interrogation room, not what happened at the trial.”212
Dripps offered his theory as an explanation of New York v. Harris,
but it also seems to fit the Court’s approach in Ventris. The Ventris
Court relied squarely on Walder, Harris, and Hass, each of which can
be read as articulating a “fairness” concern: that permitting a defendant
to testify free from cross-examination with a prior inconsistent
statement is not “fair play.” The Ventris Court quoted Walder in stating,
“It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative
use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the
defendant can . . . provide himself with a shield against contradiction of
his untruths.”213
This is not an argument about the deterrence of constitutional
violations; it is an argument about fairness. Even though the
government cannot build its case on evidence illegally obtained, it
would be unfair to allow a defendant to mislead the jury in the face of
probative, reliable (but illegally obtained) evidence to the contrary. In
Harris, the Court similarly stated:
208. Id. at 30.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 31–32.
211. Id. at 32.
212. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 167 (Mass. 2005) (“[T]he
equitable principle, at the heart of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, [is] that a party may
not gain advantage from his own wrong.”).
213. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1846 (2009) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 65 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury. . . .
Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately. . . . The shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to
use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.214
This reasoning is not about the “prophylactic” nature of the Fifth
Amendment right in Harris, but it instead concerns the fairness of
permitting a defendant to testify inconsistently with a prior statement.
In Ventris, then, the Court permitted impeachment use of statements
obtained in violation of Massiah not because Massiah is a
“prophylactic” rule, but instead because the Court reasoned that it
would be unfair to permit a defendant to affirmatively testify
inconsistently with a prior statement while shielded by the Massiah
rule—itself grounded on concerns for “fair play.” The Court in Ventris
used the terminology of both fairness and deterrence. The argument that
the defendant should not be allowed to “provide himself with a shield
against contradiction of his untruths”215 is a fairness argument. The
unfairness of the defendant’s inconsistency waives, or outweighs, his
objection to the use of illegally obtained evidence. The remaining
question is whether the evidence should nevertheless be excluded to
deter the earlier constitutional violation, and on that score Justice Scalia
confidently asserted that “the game of excluding tainted evidence for
impeachment purposes is not worth the candle.”216
In this way, both aspects of the Ventris ruling—that the Sixth
Amendment is violated at the time of the uncounseled pretrial
interrogation, but that a resulting statement can be used to impeach a
testifying defendant—can be explained by notions of “fair play.” It is
not fair to allow the government to try to secretly interrogate a
represented defendant after charges have been filed, just as it is not fair
for the defendant to be able to take the stand and contradict his past
statements, even when those statements cannot be used against him in
the government’s case-in-chief.
B. Montejo v. Louisiana: After Erasing Michigan v. Jackson, a Blank
Slate Remains
The Court’s third interrogation decision in the October 2008 term,
Montejo v. Louisiana, was also its most significant. In Montejo, the
214. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (citations omitted).
215. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Walder, 347 U.S. at 65) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
216. Id.
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Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, a 1986 decision which held that
once a defendant invoked the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at an
arraignment or similar proceeding, the police were prohibited from
initiating any interrogation of that defendant.217 The most notable
consequence of this decision is how wide open Sixth Amendment
interrogation doctrine has become now that Jackson has been overruled.
Clearly, Montejo allows police to approach a charged, represented
defendant outside the presence of counsel and seek a waiver.218 But the
ruling may actually go much further—it clears the ground for the Court
to hold in the future that police may return again and again to try and
interrogate that defendant, even if he invokes his right to counsel at
every turn. It is far from clear that the Court will go so far, but nothing
in Montejo precludes that route. In one decision, the Roberts Court has
opened up Sixth Amendment interrogation law wider than it has been in
over twenty-five years.
While Montejo swept away most of Sixth Amendment interrogation
law, the opinion consistently invokes a concern also articulated by the
Court in Shatzer: the problem of police badgering suspects into waiving
previously asserted rights. The Court’s concern (and in particular,
Justice Kennedy’s concern) with police badgering—reflected both in
Montejo and Shatzer—suggests that the Court may well create some
sort of Edwards-like rule in the Sixth Amendment context, one that
would prevent police from continually re-approaching represented
suspects to seek waivers.
The case began when police arrested Jesse Montejo on September 6,
2002, in connection with a robbery and murder. Montejo waived his
Miranda rights and eventually confessed to shooting the victim in the
course of a burglary. On September 10, Montejo was brought before a
Louisiana state judge for a preliminary hearing, where he was charged
with murder, denied bond, and appointed a lawyer.219
Later that day, police approached Montejo (before he had met with
his lawyer) and asked him to go with them to help find the murder
weapon. During the trip, he wrote a letter apologizing to the victim’s
widow. At trial, the letter (along with his earlier confession) was
admitted over defense objection. Montejo was convicted and sentenced
to death.220
On appeal, Montejo argued that police violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel—as articulated in Massiah and Michigan

217. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625, 636 (1986).
218. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090–91.
219. Id. at 2082.
220. Id.
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v. Jackson221—by approaching him after he had been appointed
counsel.222 As noted above, a defendant facing police interrogation has
at least two potential sources of protection: Fifth Amendment
protections under Miranda and Sixth Amendment protections under
Massiah.
In the Fifth Amendment context, the Court held in Edwards v.
Arizona that if a suspect invokes his right to counsel, interrogation must
cease and police are prohibited from re-initiating a later interrogation.223
In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court in Michigan v. Jackson
created an Edwards-type rule, holding that “if police initiate
interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar
proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right
to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”224
Montejo argued that once counsel had been appointed, the Jackson
rule applied and the inculpatory letter of apology had to be
suppressed.225 The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
Jackson protections applied only once a charged defendant
affirmatively requested counsel, which Montejo had not done, even
though counsel had already been appointed.226
The United States Supreme Court resolved this dilemma—whether
Jackson applied to any represented defendant, or only to defendants
who had requested counsel—by overruling Jackson entirely.227 The
majority’s first step toward overruling Jackson was its conclusion that
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s “assertion” approach “would lead either
to an unworkable standard, or to arbitrary and anomalous distinctions
between defendants in different States[,] neither [of which] would be
acceptable.”228 This first step was easy to take, because Montejo, his
amicus supporters, and the dissent all agreed that requiring a defendant
to affirmatively assert his right to counsel would be an unworkable or
arbitrary system.229 In a number of other states, “the appointment of
221. 475 U.S. 625, 626, 635 (1986).
222. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082–83.
223. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981).
224. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
225. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2082–83.
226. State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260–61 (La. 2008) (citing State v. Carter, 664 So.
2d 367, 383 (La. 1995); and Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 282–83 (5th Cir. 1992)). Most
jurisdictions had held that Jackson protections applied to any charged defendant for whom
counsel had been appointed. See, e.g., Hellum v. Warden, 28 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 1994);
Dew v. United States, 558 A.2d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Espinoza v.
Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 123 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987); Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 795 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).
227. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091.
228. Id. at 2083.
229. Id. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Overruling Michigan v. Jackson at 16–17, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529),
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counsel is automatic upon a finding of indigency, . . . sua sponte by the
court.”230 Given that practice, the majority claimed that the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s distinction “between defendants who ‘assert’ their
right to counsel and those who do not . . . is exceedingly hazy.”231
Having rejected the Louisiana “invocation” rule, the Court also
rejected Montejo’s proposed rule: that Jackson prohibits the
interrogation of any represented defendant, regardless of any “assertion”
by the defendant. This approach, the Court reasoned, was “entirely
untethered from the original rationale of Jackson,” which was to ensure
police were prevented “from badgering a defendant into waiving his
previously asserted Miranda rights.”232 When a defendant has never
asserted that he needs counsel, “there is no basis for a presumption that
any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary.”233
The Montejo Court’s overruling of Jackson has dramatically opened
up the doctrinal landscape. It is now unclear whether there is any
Edwards-type rule in the Sixth Amendment context for a charged
defendant not in custody. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Montejo
provided no explicit reassurances that Edwards has any continuing
application in the Sixth Amendment context. In Part III.A of the
decision, in which Justice Scalia “emphasiz[ed] first what is not in
dispute or at stake here,” he mentioned several still-valid Sixth
Amendment principles, none of which are an Edwards-type rule.234
Later, in Part IV, Justice Scalia again recounted the protections that still
exist after the opinion, reciting the Fifth Amendment protections that
will be available to at least those defendants being interrogated in
custody.235 Justice Scalia acknowledged that:
Montejo also correctly observes that the Miranda-Edwards
regime is narrower than Jackson in one respect: The former
applies only in the context of custodial interrogation. If the
defendant is not in custody then those decisions do not
apply; nor do they govern other, noninterrogative types of
interactions between the defendant and the State (like
pretrial lineups).236
At this point, Justice Scalia could have assuaged Montejo’s (and the
defense bar’s) concern by stating that an analogous Edwards rule would
2009 WL 1019983, at *16–17.
230. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2083 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 2084.
232. Id. at 2085 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
233. Id. at 2086.
234. Id. at 2085.
235. Id. at 2090.
236. Id.
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apply in the Sixth Amendment context once a defendant who has been
approached by police invokes his right to counsel, prohibiting police
from re-approaching that same defendant. But Justice Scalia did not
provide that reassurance. Instead, he explained why Edwards-like
protection might be unnecessary for the Sixth Amendment:
[T]hose uncovered situations are the least likely to pose a
risk of coerced waivers. When a defendant is not in
custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or
walk away to avoid police badgering. And noninterrogative
interactions with the State do not involve the ‘inherently
compelling pressures’ that one might reasonably fear could
lead to involuntary waivers.237
Thus, Edwards is needed in the Fifth Amendment context of the
compelling pressures of custodial interrogation because of the captive
defendant’s unique susceptibility to police badgering. In Sixth
Amendment noncustodial interrogation settings, however, neither of
these concerns applies.
In sum, the Montejo Court asserted that Jackson was concerned only
with the problem of police “badgering” a suspect in custodial
interrogation into waiving her rights even though she previously
asserted them. The Court also suggested this “badgering” concern might
not apply at all in the Sixth Amendment context. The Court trod very
carefully in overruling Jackson, with the result that Sixth Amendment
interrogation law is now wide open and uncertain.
1. Of “Fair Play” and Badgers: Preventing Police from Asking Suspects
to Give Up Previously Invoked Rights
As argued above, Montejo swept away much of Sixth Amendment
interrogation law. And Montejo did not replace Jackson with any
Edwards-type rule for the Sixth Amendment context, a rule that would
prohibit police from continually approaching represented defendants
even after they have asserted their rights in the first interrogation
attempt. While Montejo carefully sidestepped creating such a rule, the
decision also gives some reason to believe the Court may do so at some
future point.
Throughout the Court’s discussion of why the Jackson rule is
unnecessary, the Court at several times noted other rules—such as
Edwards—that “prevent police from badgering a defendant into
waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”238 The Court explained
that the Edwards rule, which prohibits police from re-approaching a
237. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
238. Id. at 2085 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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defendant who has previously asserted his right to counsel, “protect[s] a
suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s
presence.”239 The Court overruled Jackson in part because the rule did
not, like Edwards, simply protect the suspect’s own choice. If the
defendant (like Montejo himself) had never invoked his right to counsel
in the first place, applying the Jackson prohibition was unwarranted:
No reason exists to assume that a defendant like Montejo,
who has done nothing at all to express his intentions with
respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be
perfectly amenable to speaking with the police without
having counsel present. And no reason exists to prohibit the
police from inquiring.240
Notably, the majority’s reasoning here echoes that of Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Texas v. Cobb241 (quoted in part
above). In Cobb, the Court held that Sixth Amendment interrogation
rights are “offense specific.”242 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
(joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) cast doubt on Michigan v.
Jackson. Justice Kennedy explained that
[I]t is difficult to understand the utility of a Sixth
Amendment rule [Michigan v. Jackson] that operates to
invalidate a confession given by the free choice of suspects
who have received proper advice of their Miranda rights
but waived them nonetheless. The Miranda rule and the
related preventative rule of Edwards . . . serve to protect a
suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s
presence. The parallel rule announced in Jackson, however,
supersedes the suspect’s voluntary choice to speak with
investigators.243
Justice Kennedy argued that the Court “ought to question the wisdom of
a judge-made preventative rule to protect a suspect’s desire not to speak
when it cannot be shown that he had that intent.”244
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Cobb, like the
majority opinion in Montejo, finds its primary fault with Jackson
because it may actually interfere with a defendant who is willing to
confess to police outside the presence of counsel. For a defendant who
has informed police, at the first attempted interrogation, that he only
239. Id. at 2085–86 (quoting Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 2086–87.
241. 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
242. Id. at 167–68 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).
243. Id. at 174–75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 176.
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wants to speak in counsel’s presence, this fault no longer applies.
Rather, continued attempts to elicit confessions create the danger that
police pressure—badgering, as the Court likes to call it—will induce a
defendant to speak when he really wants to rely on counsel.
Throughout Montejo, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the
original rationale of Jackson’s rule “is to preclude the State from
badgering defendants into waiving their previously asserted rights.”245
The Court noted that “[t]he effect of this badgering might be to coerce a
waiver, which would render the subsequent interrogation a violation of
the Sixth Amendment.”246
While the Court spoke carefully in Montejo and did not commit
itself to any Edwards-type rule in the Sixth Amendment context, the
rhetorical choice of the term “badgering” is itself revealing. One could
easily use other terms to describe what police do when they re-approach
a suspect, who has previously invoked her rights, to re-ask that suspect
to waive her rights. Perhaps the police are simply “asking” the suspect
to “reconsider.” But the Court in both Shatzer and Montejo repeatedly
described this behavior with the pejorative term “badgering.”247 So long
as the Court continues to employ the rhetoric of “badgering,” it seems
likely that the Court will fashion rules limiting or prohibiting the
practice.
2. New Rules for “Fair Play” in Sixth Amendment Interrogation Law:
Thompkins Will Apply, but Shatzer Will Not
Now that Montejo has cleared away much of the Sixth Amendment
doctrinal landscape, several questions arise, in particular whether the
Court will apply, in the Sixth Amendment context, various rules it has
articulated under the Fifth Amendment. Two doctrines that come to
mind are the Thompkins ruling, effectively eliminating any affirmatively
“waiver” component to the Miranda “warnings and waiver” regime, and
the Shatzer ruling, permitting police to re-approach suspects who have
previously invoked their rights after a fourteen-day break in custody.
Will the Court apply these doctrines to the Sixth Amendment context? I
predict that under the Court’s “fair play” approach to interrogation law,
the Court will apply Thompkins in the Sixth Amendment context, but
will not apply Shatzer.
a. Sixth Amendment Waivers: Thompkins Will Apply
As noted above, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court held that a
245. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089. The majority uses the term “badger” (or a variation
thereof) ten times in its opinion. See id. at 2085–87, 2089–90.
246. Id. at 2089.
247. Id. at 2085–87, 2089–90; Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220–21 (2010).
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suspect’s inculpatory statement, given after the suspect received and
understood the Miranda warnings, constitute a valid waiver of her Fifth
Amendment rights.248 On its face, Thompkins applies only to the Fifth
Amendment, but courts will soon be asked to determine whether the
same waiver rule applies to a defendant protected by Sixth Amendment
rights rather than Fifth Amendment rights. Using what I have identified
as the Court’s “fair play” approach to interrogation law, there is every
reason to think the Court will apply the Thompkins rule equally in the
Sixth Amendment context.
Thompkins makes the most sense if one assumes that the purpose of
Miranda is to provide a suspect with “fair notice” of his rights, not to
actually dispel the coercion of the interrogation room.249 The same logic
applies in the Sixth Amendment context. When police seek to
interrogate a defendant who has been indicted and is represented by
counsel, “fair notice” requires that the police notify the defendant of his
rights to remain silent and to speak only in the presence of his attorney.
If anything, the Thompkins approach to waiver is easier to justify in the
Sixth Amendment context than in the Fifth Amendment context. After
all, Fifth Amendment interrogations occur in the unique context of
custodial interrogation; Miranda was originally concerned with
dispelling the inherent coercion in custodial interrogation.250 Sixth
Amendment interrogations, in contrast, do not necessarily occur in
custody—the Sixth Amendment applies once the suspect has been
indicted and is represented by counsel. Thus, the Court has even less
concern (perhaps no concern at all) with dispelling potential coercion.
As Justice Scalia noted in Montejo:
[Sixth Amendment interrogations] are the least likely to
pose a risk of coerced waivers. When a defendant is not in
custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or
walk away to avoid police badgering. And noninterrogative
interactions with the State do not involve the ‘inherently
compelling pressures,’ that one might reasonably fear could
lead to involuntary waivers.251
Thus in Thompkins, the Court found that the simple act of speaking
was sufficient (given a warning and a presumed understanding thereof)
to constitute a waiver of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights,
notwithstanding the inherently compelling pressures of the interrogation
room. In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court has noted that those
“inherently compelling pressures” are not present, so there is even less
248.
249.
250.
251.

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262–63 (2010).
See supra Subsection I.A.3.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (citation omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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reason to be concerned that a defendant’s choice to speak is
involuntary.252 In short, the logic of Thompkins applies with even
greater force in the context of Sixth Amendment interrogations. Under
the Court’s “fair play” approach to interrogations, police must inform
criminal defendants of their right to remain silent and right to counsel
when police approach them outside the presence of counsel. Assuming
this “fair notice” has been provided, however, the defendant from then
on speaks at his own risk; answers to questions will most likely be
deemed to be waivers of his Sixth Amendment rights.
b. Sixth Amendment Invocations: Shatzer Should Not Apply
In Shatzer v. Maryland, the Court created an expiration date for
invocations of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel: after a suspect in
custodial interrogation invokes her right to counsel, police must cease
questioning and cannot re-approach that suspect until fourteen days
after release from Miranda custody.253 In the context of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, as opposed to the Fifth Amendment right
to counsel at issue in Shatzer, the question of when an Edwards
invocation ended never arose. Under Michigan v. Jackson, police could
not even approach a represented defendant outside the presence of
counsel to try to discuss the charged offense, as long as the defendant
had asserted his right to counsel.254 Most courts interpreted Jackson’s
prohibition to apply to any represented, charged defendant.255 Under
that rule, there was no need to ask how “long” an initial invocation
lasted: given the rule prohibiting police from approaching a defendant
in the first instance, the question of when they might re-approach
252. Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
253. See supra Section I.B.
254. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
255. See United States v. Harrison, 213 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] defendant
invokes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a matter of law when (1) the defendant retains
counsel on an ongoing basis to assist with a pending criminal investigation, (2) the government
knows, or should know, that the defendant has ongoing legal representation relating to the
subject of that investigation, and (3) the eventual indictment brings charges precisely anticipated
by the scope of the pre-indictment investigation.”); Hellum v. Warden, 28 F.3d 903, 909 (8th
Cir. 1994) (stating that for represented, charged defendant, “[t]here is no doubt that Hellum’s
right to counsel had attached and been invoked prior to his . . . subsequent interrogation”); Dew
v. United States, 558 A.2d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[W]e see little, if any, room for an
argument that the Supreme Court would permit a police-initiated request for a post-indictment
waiver of counsel by a represented defendant, except through defense counsel.”); United States
ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 123 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that there was no
difference, for purposes of triggering protections, between asserting right to counsel at
arraignment versus merely accepting counsel); State v. Boorigie, 41 P.3d 764, 775 (Kan. 2002)
(same); Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Dagnall, 612
N.W.2d 680, 695 (Wis. 2000) (defendant “did not have to ‘invoke’ his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel because he . . . had an attorney”).
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simply did not arise.
In the wake of Montejo, courts will now be called upon to determine
what happens when a charged, represented defendant is approached by
police for (noncustodial) interrogation and that defendant invokes the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. One obvious option is to rely on
Shatzer and to adopt a fourteen-day break rule before reinterrogation is
permitted. For the reasons explained below, this approach should be
rejected; there is no reason to create any “expiration date” for
invocations of Sixth Amendment rights, because unlike Fifth
Amendment invocations, Sixth Amendment invocations are more
limited in scope and have a built-in expiration date.
Notwithstanding the similarity between the Fifth Amendment right
to counsel (in custodial interrogations) and the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel (after the defendant has been charged), the Court has
consistently created different rules for these two amendments. Most
notably, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific: it
applies only to the offense or offenses with which the defendant has
actually been charged.256 Putting aside Fifth Amendment protections
(which apply only in custodial interrogations), the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel only protects defendants with respect to the charged
crime(s). Police can attempt to interrogate the defendant outside of
custody for other uncharged crimes, and need not provide any warnings.
And if the defendant invokes her Sixth Amendment right to counsel as
to the charged crimes, police can still try to interrogate her for other
uncharged crimes.257
The Fifth Amendment, in contrast, is not offense-specific: it applies
to all police attempts to interrogate a suspect about any offense. Thus, a
suspect in custody must be given Miranda warnings before any
interrogation, no matter whether the interrogation relates to the crime
for which he was taken into custody or for some other possible offense.
And when a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel
during a custodial interrogation, police cannot attempt to interrogate
him about some other matter.258
The Shatzer rule was created in response to this unique feature of
Fifth Amendment invocations. Because Fifth Amendment rights are not
tied to any particular offense, a suspect’s invocation of Fifth
Amendment rights potentially lasts forever, and as to all crimes: once a
suspect has invoked her right to counsel during one custodial
interrogation, police are potentially barred from ever attempting to re256. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167–68 (2001); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
175 (1991).
257. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173–74; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
258. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675, 683–84 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–86 (1981).
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interrogate her, even about some wholly unrelated crime years later.
Without some “expiration” of the sort created in Shatzer, Justice Alito’s
extreme hypothetical could occur: a suspect who invoked his right to
counsel in Maryland in a 1999 interrogation for suspected joy riding
could not be questioned in 2009 for a murder in Montana.259
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not share this
feature of Fifth Amendment law, no Shatzer-type expiration rule is
required. In the Sixth Amendment context, a defendant’s invocation of
the right to counsel does not prohibit any future police interrogation; it
merely prohibits future police interrogation related to the specific
offense or offenses with which the defendant has already been charged.
This means the invocation is limited in both scope and time.
First, as to scope, the invocation only applies to the charged
offenses. If police want to ask the defendant about uncharged offenses,
they are free to do so, even after the defendant has invoked her Sixth
Amendment rights.
Second, as to time, the invocation of Sixth Amendment rights is
limited by the natural life of the existing criminal prosecution. Once the
defendant is either convicted (through a guilty plea or conviction after
trial) or acquitted, the Sixth Amendment prohibition presumably ends;
because the prohibition is tied to the pending offense, once the offense
is no longer pending, the prohibition also disappears.
Thus, in the Sixth Amendment context, the Shatzer fourteen-day rule
is a solution in search of a problem. In the Sixth Amendment context,
there is no “eternal invocation” problem: the invocation of the right to
counsel only applies to the offense charged, and that prohibition ends
once the charged offense is terminated through conviction, acquittal, or
dismissal of charges.
In addition to being unnecessary, the Shatzer rule is also undesirable
in the Sixth Amendment context. The Shatzer rule states that police may
re-approach a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel fourteen
days after a release from Miranda custody.260 In the Sixth Amendment
context, the suspect need not even be in custody in the first place. Thus,
the Shatzer rule would turn into a simple fourteen-day rule: once a
represented defendant invokes his right to counsel, police may reapproach him fourteen days later to again attempt to interrogate him
outside the presence of counsel. Because the defendant need not be in
“custody,” that part of Shatzer no longer applies. Assuming the Court
creates any type of Edwards protection for the Sixth Amendment
context—any rule prohibiting police from badgering a defendant into
reneging on her previous invocation of the right to counsel—it would be
259. Shatzer Transcript, supra note 116, at 31–32.
260. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010).
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strange to place a two-week expiration date on that protection. Once a
criminal suspect has been charged and become a criminal defendant, his
need for counsel’s assistance is heightened.261 In that context, a
defendant who tells police, upon being approached for interrogation,
that he wants to deal with them only through counsel, should be
protected against any further police badgering.
Thus, the Shatzer fourteen-day rule is both unnecessary and
undesirable in the context of Sixth Amendment invocations. Unlike
Thompkins, which likely applies in the Sixth Amendment context as
well as the Fifth, Shatzer should be limited to the Fifth Amendment
context in which it is needed.
III. THE “FAIR PLAY” MODEL: FAULTY PREMISES MAKE FOR BAD
DOCTRINE
Parts I and II described how the Roberts Court interrogation
decisions are reshaping both Fifth and Sixth Amendment interrogation
rules toward the underlying principle of “fair play” in interrogations.
Part III evaluates that change.
The core problem with the Roberts Court’s “fair play” principle is
that, as the Court applies it in the cases discussed herein, it presupposes
an interrogation suspect who is autonomous, competent, and
empowered to protect his interests. The “fair play” model represents a
rejection of the Warren Court’s description of the problem: that
individuals undergoing police interrogation face inherent compulsions
that threaten to “exact[] a heavy toll on individual liberty and trade[] on
the weakness of individuals.”262 The Warren Court’s solution to this
problem, in the form of the Miranda and Massiah rules for
interrogation, have been long criticized from both the right and the
left.263 But the diagnosis itself—that suspects facing police interrogation
are vulnerable to abuse and overreaching—has proven robust, supported
by a growing body of experiential and empirical research.264 Thus, the
Roberts Court’s “fair play” principle for interrogation, which
presupposes autonomous suspects who do not need protection from
inherent pressures, does not match the state of the evidence.
First, the ongoing trend of DNA exonerations by convicts, including
a number who falsely confessed to their crimes, has proven that
suspects in interrogation are more susceptible to false confession than
261. This is evident from, among other things, the fact that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel mandates governmental provision of counsel after the defendant has been charged, but
not before. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963).
262. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455, 458 (1966).
263. See supra note 17.
264. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
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had previously been thought possible.265 Many people, including judges
and jurors, have long shared a commonsense belief that an innocent
person would not confess to a serious crime except under circumstances
of extreme duress, such as prolonged torture.266 Repeated
exonerations—either by DNA or by the identification of the true guilty
party—of convicts who confessed to serious crimes show that this
commonsense belief is inaccurate, and false confessions are more
common than we intuitively would guess.267 Thus, “[t]here is a new
awareness among scholars, legislators, courts, prosecutors, police
departments, and the public that innocent people falsely confess, often
due to psychological pressure placed upon them during police
interrogations.”268 The Roberts Court’s “fair play” rules presuppose that
suspects in interrogation are autonomous agents capable of looking out
for their own interests, not inherently vulnerable to police pressures.
That is to say, the “fair play” rules reflect the commonsense belief that
innocent persons would not falsely confess except under extreme
duress, and thus do not need any special protections from police
pressures. Mounting evidence shows this commonsense belief is false,
and re-affirms the Warren Court’s assumption that suspects in
interrogation are more vulnerable to police pressure than many of us
intuitively believe.
Second, empirical psychological studies have provided coherent
explanations for this phenomenon. Professor Brandon L. Garrett
explains that “[s]cholars increasingly study the psychological
techniques that can cause people to falsely confess and have
documented how such techniques were used in instances of known false
confessions.”269 Indeed, “psychologists have known that people are
highly responsive to reinforcement and subject to the laws of
conditioning, and that behavior is influenced more by perceptions of
265. See Steven A Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 904–06 (2004) (“[S]tudies report that the number of
false confessions range from 8–25% of the total miscarriages of justices studied, thus
establishing the problem of false confessions as a leading cause of wrongful convictions of the
innocent in America.”).
266. This commonsense belief is typified by John Henry Wigmore’s claim that false
confessions were “scarcely conceivable,” “of the rarest occurrence,” and that “[n]o trustworthy
figures of authenticated instances exist . . . .” 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 835, 867 (2d ed. 1923);
see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6, 24 (2010) (“[M]ost people reasonably believe that they would
never confess to a crime they did not commit and have only rudimentary understanding of the
predispositional and situational factors that would lead someone to do so.”).
267. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 265, at 904–06.
268. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
1052–53 (2010).
269. Id. at 1053.
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short-term than long-term consequences.”270 Additionally, psychologists
have determined “that individuals are highly vulnerable to influence
from change agents who seek their compliance.”271 In particular,
suspects in interrogation are vulnerable to identified psychological tools
relating to “attitudes and persuasion, informational and normative
influences, the use of sequential request strategies, . . . and the gradual
escalation of commands, issued by figures of authority, to effectively
obtain self- and other-defeating acts of obedience.”272 Custodial
interrogation exploits established psychological problems with
“memory transience, misattribution effects, suggestibility, and bias.”273
In short, the Roberts Court’s presumption that suspects in
interrogation are autonomous agents capable of protecting their own
interests is wrong. The resulting rules of “fair play” in interrogation fail
to adequately protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination
and the guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal cases. If
one accepts the premise that the privilege against compelled selfincrimination applies to custodial interrogation, then the Roberts
Court’s refusal to acknowledge the serious compulsions inherent in
custodial interrogation is wrongheaded. The Court has offered no
convincing rebuttal of that basic premise; it has just slowly and steadily
marginalized it.
The Court’s model “works” only by presupposing a population that
approaches the police with an attitude of suspicion and contempt, rather
than respect and reasonable deference. If the population exhibits the
attitude toward the police that the Court would likely expect and
desire—namely an attitude of respect and reasonable deference to
authority—then the Court’s model will result in that population
consistently and predictably making poor choices in custodial
interrogation, and succumbing to the inherent pressures of the
interrogation room. Ironically, recent studies have suggested that
“innocence itself may put innocents at risk.”274 This happens because
“people who stand falsely accused tend to believe that truth and justice
will prevail and that their innocence will become transparent to
investigators, juries, and others[,]” and thus, such innocents “cooperate
fully with police, often failing to realize that they are suspects not
witnesses.” 275
If the Court’s “fair play” principle rests on unrealistic assumptions
270. Kassin et al., supra note 266, at 15.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citations omitted).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 22 (citing Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence
Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 223–24 (2005)).
275. Id. at 22–23 (citing Kassin, supra note 266, at 224).
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about human behavior in interrogation, why is the Court shaping
interrogation law along these misguided lines? The “fair play” model
allows the Court to shape Miranda and related interrogation rules to
facilitate police interrogation and the use of confessions in criminal
cases, by providing a “safe harbor” for police.276 So long as police
satisfy the requirements of the Court’s relatively clear and policefriendly interrogation rules, police interrogation techniques will not be
overly scrutinized, and the resulting confession will very likely be
admissible.
By reformulating the Miranda rules under the “fair play” rubric, the
Roberts Court has made it much easier for police to reach that safe
harbor. Through Powell, which required only “fair notice” of rights
rather than clear evidence that the suspect comprehends and appreciates
her rights, the Court imposed a relatively simple requirement on police
(recite some version of the warnings) instead of the more difficult task
of ensuring that a possibly uneducated, scared, defensive, or confused
suspect truly comprehends her rights in the interrogation setting.
Through Thompkins, the Court removed a barrier that might prevent
police from reaching the Miranda safe harbor, by eliminating the
requirement that police elicit a distinct waiver from the suspect separate
from and before any admissible confession. Thus, Thompkins makes the
“safe harbor” less dependent on what the suspect does or fails to do, and
more within the exclusive realm of police following the required
procedures.
Shatzer limited the damage to police interrogation done by a
suspect’s successful invocation of the right to counsel, by allowing
police to return after a fourteen-day break in Miranda custody. The
majority created for police a clear (and not very onerous) time limitation
of two weeks, permitting police to again try to reach the Miranda safe
harbor. The majority was wholly unconcerned with Justice Stevens’
objection that by failing to actually provide the suspect with counsel
during that two-week period, the police have effectively misled the
suspect and potentially caused the suspect to understand that her rights
are illusory.277 The suspect is told, “You have a right to a lawyer during
276. See FRIED, supra note 9, at 45 (“[M]ost professional law-enforcement organizations
had learned to live with Miranda, and even to love it, to the extent that it provided them with a
safe harbor . . . .”); Klein, supra note 9, at 1033 (“[A] ‘constitutional safe harbor rule’ is a
judicially created procedure that, if properly followed by the government actor, insulates the
government from the argument that the constitutional clause at issue was violated.”).
277. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1225 (2010); id. at 1229 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“When police tell an indigent suspect that he has the right to an
attorney, that he is not required to speak without an attorney present, and that an attorney will be
provided to him at no cost before questioning, the police have made a significant promise. If
they cease questioning and then reinterrogate the suspect 14 days later without providing him
with a lawyer, the suspect is likely to feel that the police lied to him and that he really does not

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/4

52

Witmer-Rich: Interrogation and the Roberts Court

2011]

INTERROGATION AND THE ROBERTS COURT

1241

this interrogation.” The suspect responds, “Okay, I want a lawyer during
my interrogation.” Police then leave, and no lawyer is provided—even
if the suspect keeps asking his jailers, “Can I get a lawyer? The cops
told me I could have one.” Two weeks later, police again show up,
without a lawyer, and ask to interrogate the suspect, again warning him
that he has a right to a lawyer—the same right he previously invoked,
and the same request which did not result in a lawyer being provided.
The reasonable message received by the unsophisticated inmate could
well be that the promise of a lawyer is illusory and that police will recite
certain warnings but not follow through on their promises.278
The point here is that the majority’s rule in Shatzer is simply not
designed to ensure that a suspect understands her rights and is
sufficiently empowered to protect those rights during the custodial
interrogation. Rather, the rule created clear, easily met rules that police
can follow to reach the Miranda safe harbor.
The Sixth Amendment rules, after Montejo, are far less clear than the
Fifth Amendment rules; thus, it is more difficult to make definitive
evaluations of the Court’s approach—much of its approach remains to
be seen. At a minimum, Montejo’s overruling of Michigan v. Jackson
begins to create space for police to successfully interrogate charged,
represented defendants. Montejo gives the Court the space to craft “safe
harbor” rules for police-initiated interrogation in the Sixth Amendment
context, as it has done in the Fifth Amendment context. Whether the
Court will actually do so remains to be seen.
In Ventris, the Court clarified that when police violate the Sixth
Amendment interrogation rules (the content of which are still largely
uncertain), the violation occurs at the time of interrogation, not when
the statement is later used at trial. Rather than create a “safe harbor”
rule, the Court in Ventris continued its trend of reducing the
consequences for police when they do violate constitutional
interrogation rules—thereby permitting some use of confessions
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
If the Roberts Court’s “fair play” rules are flawed, what
interrogation rules should the Court be creating? The central flaw in the
Roberts Court approach to interrogation is that it rests on faulty
assumptions about how suspects behave in interrogations. The best way
forward is to create interrogation rules based on what current research
tells us about interrogation. A good start is articulated by Professor Saul
have any right to a lawyer.”).
278. The sophisticated suspect will realize that the warning, “You have a right to an
attorney during this interrogation,” really means, “If you tell us you want a lawyer, we will stop
interrogating you,”—not that a lawyer will in fact be provided. But of course the latter
message—that the right to a lawyer is instead, in practice, the right to terminate the
interrogation—is not part of the required Miranda warnings.
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M. Kassin and his co-authors in their recent article, Police-Induced
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations.279 Those
recommendations include:
1. Videotape custodial interrogations: “all custodial
interviews and interrogations of felony suspects should be
videotaped in their entirety and with a camera angle that
focuses equally on the suspect and interrogator.”280
2. Shift from a “confrontational” model of
interrogation—where guilt is presumed and the sole aim is
to elicit a confession—to an “investigative” model of
interrogation—where police do not presume guilt but
instead seek to obtain information about crimes.281
3. Limit the time a suspect is interrogated and held in
isolation.282
4. Ban or limit police ability to lie or present false
evidence to a suspect in interrogation, given research
indicating “that outright lies can put innocents at risk to
confess by leading them to feel trapped by the inevitability
of evidence against them.”283
5. Ban or more strictly regulate the strategy of
“minimization”—in which police imply leniency for a
suspect who confesses—in light of research showing “that
implicit promises can put innocents at risk to confess by
leading them to perceive that the only way to lessen or
escape punishment is by complying with the interrogator’s
demand for confession.”284

279. Kassin et al., supra note 266.
280. Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted).
281. Id. at 27–28.
282. Id. at 28.
283. Id. at 28–29 (noting evidence of this problem consists of: “(1) the aggregation of
actual false confession cases, many of which involved use of the false evidence ploy; (2) one
hundred-plus years of basic psychology research, which proves without equivocation that
misinformation can substantially alter people’s visual perceptions, beliefs, motivations,
emotions, attitudes, memories, self-assessments, and even certain physiological outcomes, as
seen in studies of the placebo effect; and (3) numerous experiments, from different laboratories,
demonstrating that presentations of false evidence increase the rate at which innocent research
participants agree to confess to prohibited acts they did not commit.”).
284. Id. at 29–30 (evidence of this problem consists of: “(1) the aggregation of actual false
confession cases, the vast majority of which involved the use of minimization or explicit
promises of leniency; (2) basic psychological research indicating, first, that people are highly
responsive to reinforcement and make choices designed to maximize their outcomes, and second
that people can infer certain consequences in the absence of explicit promises and threats by
pragmatic implication; and (3) experiments specifically demonstrating that minimization
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6. Protect particularly vulnerable suspects, such as
“juveniles and people who are cognitively impaired or
psychologically disordered.”285
The central purpose of this Article is to identify the underlying
principle driving the Roberts Court’s reshaping of constitutional
interrogation law, not to articulate the best set of interrogation rules a
court or legislature could create. Therefore, while the suggestions above
from a group of experts are certainly a good start, my purpose is not to
fully endorse any particular set of rules.
CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court’s constitutional interrogation decisions show
hostility towards the Warren Court’s deep concern for protecting
vulnerable suspects from the coercion of interrogation. Instead, the
Roberts Court is reshaping interrogation rules toward the concept of
“fair play” in interrogations, a rubric which presupposes interrogation
suspects as autonomous agents capable of actively protecting their own
interests and expected to do so. This underlying assumption, however, is
unfounded and inconsistent with a steadily growing body of experience
(in the form of DNA exonerations of convicts who confessed) and
empirical research. Because the Court’s foundational premise is wrong,
its resulting rules of “fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately
protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the
guarantee of the assistance of counsel in criminal cases.

increases the rate at which research participants infer leniency in punishment and confess, even
if they are innocent” (citations omitted)).
285. Id. at 30.
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